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CONCEPTUAL COMPARISONS: TOWARDS A 
COHERENT METHODOLOGY OF 
COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES 
Oliver Brand*
ABSTRACT 
unctionalism is still the dominant method of comparative legal 
studies. This, however, is not the case because functional analysis 
is particularly well suited for the needs of comparatists, but because of a 
lack of alternatives. Comparative Law and Economics and various 
“postmodern” approaches have failed to provide more viable solutions. 
The first part of this Article examines the virtues and flaws of the respec-
tive methods. Under the heading of Conceptual Comparisons, the second 
part introduces a new approach to comparative law. It follows the lead of 
other comparative sciences, which have abandoned functionalism some 
time ago and have replaced it with typological considerations. Concep-
tual Comparisons adapts these considerations to the particular needs of 
legal research, thus opening new avenues for the perception of law and 
its role in different legal systems. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
“Oh eerie tis to roam the fen,”1 shivers the Münsterian poet Annette 
von Droste-Hülshoff—and boggy indeed are the contemporaneous fields 
of comparative law. Peril seems to lurk under every footstep because 
comparatists supposedly try to reach dry ground without the guidance of 
serious thoughts on methodology. Methodological “avoidance,”2 “agnos-
ticism,”3 or even “anarchism”4 are said to be prevalent. On closer reflec-
 
 1. ANNETTE VON DROSTE-HÜLSHOFF, Der Knabe im Moor, in SÄMTLICHE WERKE 83 
(1966) (F.R.G). 
 2. Hiram E. Chodosh, Comparing Comparisons: In Search of Methodology, 84 IOWA 
L. REV. 1025, 1044 (1999); William Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (I): What Was It 
Like to Try a Rat?, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1889, 1891 (1995) [hereinafter Ewald, Compara-
tive Jurisprudence (I)]. 
 3. John C. Reitz, How to Do Comparative Law, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 617, 618 (1998); 
see Geoffrey Samuel, Epistemology and Comparative Law: Contributions from the Sci-
ences and Social Sciences, in EPISTEMOLOGY AND METHODOLOGY OF COMPARATIVE LAW 
35, 35–36 (Marc Van Hoecke ed., 2004). 
 4. TP van Reenen, Major Theoretical Problems of Modern Comparative Legal 
Methodology (1): The Nature and Role of the Tertium Comparationis, 28 COMP. & INT’L 
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tion, however, the methodological malaise of comparative law seems to 
be incoherence rather than a lack of efforts. From the mid-1990s onward, 
scholars sailing under the somewhat enigmatic banner of “postmodern-
ism”5 have sparked a lively debate on comparative methodology. Com-
paratists nonetheless still “start from different points and proceed in dif-
ferent directions with different goals,” as Merryman complained as early 
as 1974.6 Meaningful results are obscured because the different schools 
of methodological thought do not engage in constructive discourse. Thus, 
the central question of whether we can we afford a pluralism of methods7 
in comparative law or whether we have to encourage consensus8 has be-
come a Gordian knot. 
This Article will try to sever the knot by devising a methodological ap-
proach to comparative studies that allows scholars to work in their dif-
ferent traditions, but come to coherent results. My argument consists of 
three parts. First, I will present the dominant approach to comparative 
studies, functionalism, and analyze it critically (Part II). Subsequently, 
newer trends that challenge functionalism are introduced and assessed 
(Part III). In these parts it will be maintained that none of the existing 
methods suitably fulfils the needs of the comparatist, either to serve as a 
platform for dialogue or to demand supremacy over the other ap-
proaches. Accordingly, Part IV is dedicated to the proposal, explanation, 
and illustration of a new method of comparative legal studies: Concep-
tual Comparisons. 
 
L.J. S. AFR. 175, 175 (1995); see Georges Langrod, Quelques réflexions méthodologiques 
sur la comparaison en science juridique [Some Methodological Reflections on the Com-
parison in Juridicial Science], 9 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARÉ [R.I.D.C.] 
353, 354–56 (1957) (Fr.). 
 5. Anne Peters & Heiner Schwenke, Comparative Law Beyond Post-Modernism, 49 
INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 800, 801 (2000). 
 6.  John Henry Merryman, Address to the Ninth International Congress of Compara-
tive Law in Teheran (1974); see also John Henry Merryman, Fines, Objeto y Metodo del 
Derecho Comparado, 9 BOLETÍN MEXICANO DE DERECHO COMPARADO 65 (1976), avail-
able at http://www.juridicas.unam.mx/publica/librev/rev/boletin/cont/25/art/art5.pdf. 
 7. Jaakko Husa, Farewell to Functionalism or Methodological Tolerance?, 67 
RABELSZ 419, 444 (2003); Ralf Michaels, Im Westen Nichts Neues: 100 Jahre Pariser 
Kongreß für Rechtsvergleichung—Gedanken anläßlich einer Jubiläumskonferenz in New 
Orleans, 66 RABELSZ 97, 114 (2002) (F.R.G); Vernon Valentine Palmer, From Lerotholi 
to Lando: Some Examples of Comparative Law Methodology, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 261 
(2005). 
 8. Xavier Blanc-Jouvan, Centennial World Congress on Comparative Law: Opening 
Remarks, 75 TUL. L. REV. 859, 863 (2001). 
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II. DOMINANT APPROACH—FUNCTIONALISM 
In the history of comparative law, periods of integrative comparison 
have continuously exchanged with those of contrastive comparison.9 To-
day, the hallmark of the former, the so-called “functional method,” has 
risen to a position of dominance:10 functionalists author the major trea-
tises on comparative law, fill the editorial boards of comparative jour-
nals, and preside over societies dedicated to the study of the subject. 
A. Operation 
Functionalism is so centrally relevant to contemporary comparative 
law because of its orientation towards the practical. It is particularly con-
cerned with how to compare the law’s consequences across legal systems 
and therefore allows rules and concepts to be appreciated for what they 
do, rather than for what they say. Functionalists believe that the “func-
tion” of a rule, its social purpose, is the common denominator (tertium 
comparationis) that permits comparison. 
Functional comparisons rest on three central premises. The first prem-
ise relates to the realist conception of the law as an instrument for chan-
neling human behavior and claims that the law answers to social needs or 
interests.11 This premise establishes the “problem–solution approach” 
that functionalists champion.12 They begin their comparisons by choos-
ing a particular practical problem. Then, they present legal systems with 
regard to how they resolve this problem. In a third step, similarities and 
differences between the solutions are listed, explained, and evaluated. 
The second premise of functionalism addresses the problem that the 
actual function of legal institutions is a matter of sociological concern. 
To avoid large-scale empirical investigations, functionalists presuppose 
that the problems that the law is asked to resolve are similar or even 
identical across different legal systems. “If law is seen functionally as a 
regulator of social facts, the legal problems of all countries are similar. 
Every legal system . . . is open to the same questions and subject to the 
 
 9. Rudolph B. Schlesinger, The Past and Future of Comparative Law, 43 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 477, 477 (1995). 
 10. Peter Leyland, Oppositions and Fragmentations: In Search of a Formula for 
Comparative Analysis?, in COMPARATIVE LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY 211, 215 (Andrew 
Harding & Esin Örücü eds., 2002); Peters & Schwenke, supra note 5, at 809. But cf. 
Michele Graziadei, The Functionalist Heritage, in TRADITIONS AND TRANSITIONS 100, 
100 (Pierre Legrand & Roderick Munday eds., 2003). 
 11.  Richard Hyland, Comparative Law, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 
AND LEGAL THEORY 184, 185–87 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1999). 
 12. KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 43–44 
(Tony Weir trans., 3d ed. 1998); Husa, supra note 7, at 425. 
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same standards, even in countries of different social structures or differ-
ent stages of development.”13
The third methodological premise of functionalism, the praesumptio 
similitudinis, maintains that legal systems tend to resolve practical ques-
tions in the same way. “[D]ifferent legal systems give the same or very 
similar solutions, even as to detail, to the same problems of life, despite 
the great differences in their historical development, conceptual struc-
ture, and style of operation.”14 Two reasons explain the existence of this 
rather counter-intuitive presumption. First, it enables the comparatist to 
scrutinize social problems and their solutions within the familiar legal 
framework, rather than having to venture into sociological research. Sec-
ond, the presumption of similarity can be used as a means of testing the 
results of a comparison:  
 
the comparatist can rest content if his researches . . . lead to 
the conclusion that the systems he has compared reach the 
same or similar practical results, but if he finds that there are 
great differences or indeed diametrically opposite results, he 
should be warned and go back to check again whether the 
terms in which he posed his original question were indeed 
purely functional, and whether he has spread the net of his re-
searches quite wide enough.15  
 
The praesumptio suggests that comparative research is not complete until 
it has been demonstrated that the legal systems under consideration reach 
similar results in similar circumstances. This highlights that functional 
studies are out for the grand similarities of legal systems, not for differ-
ences in detail. 
Grounded on these three premises, functionalists have been most inter-
ested in explaining how norms are similar or different from one jurisdic-
tion to another, how such norms are borrowed or transplanted, and how 
they are expressed in differing or similar kinds of rules. Normatively, 
they have fostered the production of uniform law, most suggestively with 
 
 13. ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 12, at 44. For a more cautious analysis, see Hein 
Kötz, Abschied von der Rechtskreislehre?, 6 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR EUROPÄISCHES 
PRIVATRECHT 493, 504–05 (1998) (F.R.G); for an even more fundamental functionalist 
view, see Uwe Kischel, Vorsicht, Rechtsvergleichung!, 104 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
VERGLEICHENDE RECHTSWISSENSCHAFTEN 10, 16 (2005) (F.R.G). 
 14. ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 12, at 39. 
 15. Id. at 40; see also A.E. Örücü, Method and Object of Comparative Law, in 
METHODE EN OBJECT IN DE RECHTSWETENSCHAPPEN 57, 60–61 (H.W. Blom & R.J. de 
Folter eds., 1986) (F.R.G). 
2007] CONCEPTUAL COMPARISONS 411 
                                                                                                            
their attempt to delineate a common core of legal institutions.16 They 
believe that they can study legal systems neutrally. The choice of func-
tionality as a tertium comparationis is partially an expression of the de-
sire to avoid seeing foreign legal systems through the mind-set of one’s 
own legal system.17 The functional method disregards differences in 
technical-juridical construction and legal concept so as to deconstruct the 
local dimension of rules: “the solutions we find in the different jurisdic-
tions must be cut loose from their conceptual context and stripped of 
their national doctrinal overtones so that they may be seen purely in the 
light of their function, as an attempt to satisfy a particular legal need.”18
B. Development 
From the late nineteenth century onwards, functionalism permeated all 
social sciences. In comparative law, it supplanted previous formalism in 
the 1920s. Conventionally, Ernst Rabel is its proclaimed father.19 In the 
1950s and ‘60s, functionalism in comparative law was cross-fertilized 
with anthropological and sociological functionalism, particularly due to 
the influence of Luhmann.20 This “embededness” of comparative legal 
functionalism in the network of the social sciences raises first doubts 
over its future: from the 1970s onward, objections to functionalism con-
vinced the other social sciences to abandon it.21 That begs the question of 
whether law is the “happy match” for functionalism or whether similar 
objections that uprooted functionalism in other social sciences also ne-
cessitate its abandonment for comparative law. 
 
 16. See generally PIERRE BONASSIES ET AL., FORMATION OF CONTRACTS: A STUDY OF 
THE COMMON CORE OF LEGAL SYSTEMS (Rudolf Schlesinger ed., 1968). 
 17. David J. Gerber, Sculpturing the Agenda of Comparative Law: Ernst Rabel and 
the Facade of Language, in RETHINKING THE MASTERS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 190, 199 
(Annelise Riles ed., 2001). 
 18. ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 12, at 44; Reitz, supra note 3, at 621–22. 
 19. ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 12, at 61; Ulrich Drobnig, Die Geburt der mod-
ernen Rechtsvergleichung, 14 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR EUROPÄISCHES PRIVATRECHT 821 (2005) 
(F.R.G); Peters & Schwenke, supra note 5, at 808. In fact, Rabel’s method merely re-
phrases earlier studies of Max Solomon. See generally MAX SALOMON, GRUNDLEGUNG 
ZUR RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE 26–39 (1925) (F.R.G). To focus on Rabel, however, is defensi-
ble on the ground that he and his disciples became leading comparatists in the United 
States and Germany, and thus guarantors for the success of the method. 
 20. Günter Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons: Re-thinking Comparative Law, 26 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 411, 434 (1985) [hereinafter Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons]; An-
nelise Riles, Wigmore’s Treasure Box: Comparative Law in the Era of Information, 40 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 221, 233 (1999). 
 21. William R. Schonfeld, Political Parties: The Functional Approach and the Struc-
tural Alternative, 15 COMP. POL. 477, 478–80 (1983). 
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Another issue is that in the beginning, functionalism—as devised by 
Rabel—served only two very specific ends. First, it was meant to solve 
the characterization problem in the field of conflict of laws, which was of 
“great scholarly concern during the first decades of the twentieth cen-
tury.”22 Secondly, efforts were undertaken at the same time to unify 
commercial law in a new and unstable socio-economic environment.23 In 
particular, the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law 
(UNIDROIT) in Rome asked a number of leading comparative schol-
ars—among them Rabel—to draft a uniform law for the international 
sale of goods. Rabel hypothesized that, if the legal constructions and 
characterizations particular to each legal system were ignored and if at-
tention were instead directed exclusively to the law’s actual conse-
quences, then a common or best solution would emerge naturally and 
directly from the comparison.24
Rheinstein, one of Rabel’s disciples, first suggested that the functional 
method could be generalized and applied beyond the contexts of conflict 
of laws and unification of law to the entire comparative process.25 This 
generalization is related to theories of sociological jurisprudence, espe-
cially those of Pound and von Jhering (Interessenjurisprudenz).26 How-
ever, that functionalism originated as a specialized instrument to deal 
with specific problems casts doubt over the validity of this generaliza-
tion. 
C. Putative Problems with the Functional Method 
Accordingly, the functional method has not escaped criticism. Some of 
the objections, however, miss the point: while aiming at the method as 
such, they in fact hit instances of incorrect exercise of functionalism. 
1. Particularism 
Gerber has accused the functional method of producing results that are 
“particularist,” i.e., unrelated to the socio-economic and historical cir-
 
 22. Graziadei, supra note 10, at 103–04. 
 23. BASIL MARKESINIS, COMPARATIVE LAW IN THE COURTROOM AND IN THE 
CLASSROOM: THE STORY OF THE LAST THIRTY-FIVE YEARS 45 (2003). 
 24. Ernst Rabel, Aufgabe und Notwendigkeit der Rechtsvergleichung, 3 GESAMMELTE 
AUFSÄTZE 17 (1924) (F.R.G).  
 25. MAX RHEINSTEIN, EINFÜHRUNG IN DIE RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG 25–27 (2d ed. 1987) 
(F.R.G). 
 26. See F. C. Auld, Methods of Comparative Jurisprudence, 8 U. TORONTO L.J. 83, 86 
(1950). 
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cumstances that dictated them.27 In another version of this critique, the 
functional method is criticized for being formalistic or “legocentric.”28 
As an essentially empirical-inductive method, it is said to rely too heav-
ily on positive legal phenomena embodied in rule-texts and to pay too 
little attention to “law in action,” i.e., the law in its practical application. 
Indeed, when turning to the leading textbooks, the numerous facts delib-
erately left out of the picture because they are considered disruptive to 
the operation of the method is surprising. Schlesinger, for example, fails 
to mention history, mores, and ethics.29 While it may be true that many 
functionalists did not always attend to all the factors that play a part in 
the production of the problem being examined, more recent studies have 
shown that the functional method as such is capable of doing so. Modern 
functional comparisons generally accept that comparatists should study 
not “law in books,” but “law in action”30—though they might not always 
adhere to this advice in practice. Additionally, they routinely study rules 
and institutions as part of a larger socio-legal and political context and 
assess customs and other social practices as devices for solving prob-
lems, as, for example, Cappelletti proved in his piece on questions of 
civil procedure.31 However, even the most contextual study can only par-
tially address the extra-legal interdependencies of law. Legal compari-
sons remain “essayistic.”32 This is not a particular flaw of functionalism, 
but a truth that comparatists will have to accept independently from the 
method with which they are working. 
 
 27. Gerber, supra note 17, at 204; see also MARKESINIS, supra note 23, at 39; Grazia-
dei, supra note 10, at 109. 
 28. Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons, supra note 20, at 438; Lawrence M. Fried-
man, Some Thoughts on Comparative Legal Culture, in COMPARATIVE AND PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN ON HIS SEVENTIETH 
BIRTHDAY 49, 52 (David S. Clark ed., 1990); see also Pierre Legrand, How to Compare 
Now, 16 LEGAL STUD. 232, 235 (1996) [hereinafter Legrand, How to Compare Now]. 
 29. RUDOLF B. SCHLESINGER ET. AL., COMPARATIVE LAW: CASES, TEXT, MATERIALS 
32 (5th ed. 1992). 
 30. RENE DAVID, TRAITE ELEMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL COMPARE [ELEMENTARY 
TREATISE ON COMPARATIVE CIVIL LAW] 17–25 (1950) (Fr.); see 1 ADOLF F. SCHNITZER, 
VERGLEICHENDE RECHTSLEHRE 31–32 (1961) (F.R.G); Ulrich Drobnig, Methods of Socio-
logical Research in Comparative Law, 35 RABELSZ 496, 498 (1971); William Ewald, 
Posner’s Economic Approach to Comparative Law, 33 TEX. INT’L L.J. 381, 383 (1998) 
[hereinafter Ewald, Posner’s Economic Approach]. 
 31. MAURO CAPPELLETTI & BRYANT GARTH, A World Survey, in 1 ACCESS TO JUSTICE 
7–8 (1978); see also Husa, supra note 7, at 423. 
 32. Wolkfgang Mincke, Eine vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft, 83 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
VERGLEICHENDE RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 315, 323–24 (1984) (F.R.G). 
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2. Externalism 
More serious is the accusation that functional studies suffer from tak-
ing a purely external view upon the legal systems under comparison. 
Adopting such a perspective is said to lead to a lack of “immersion,” i.e., 
a failure in understanding the ideas that lie behind foreign legal systems 
from the inside.33 Externalism, however, is not necessarily disadvanta-
geous at all, as elucidated by the search for hidden assumptions of differ-
ent legal systems begun in the 1990s.34 Such assumptions are difficult to 
detect by lawyers within a particular system, but are more easily under-
stood by foreign lawyers looking from the outside. It is usually the latter 
who unveil the explicatory potential of unconscious legal assumptions 
that are so obvious that “culturally immersed” lawyers are barely aware 
of them. Furthermore, it is an illusion to believe that the comparatist will 
ever be able to “immerse” in a foreign legal culture—however closely 
related this culture might be. Kohler and Großfeld are right: the compara-
tist will always remain bound by his or her preconceptions and cultural 
disposition; the comparatist will stay “one of his [or her] own people.”35
3. Ethnocentricity 
Another supposed flaw of the functional method is ethnocentricity.36 
For the last several decades, U.S.-based émigrés from Europe and their 
students have led the functional community. These scholars have main-
tained close ties with their European counterparts. Not surprisingly, 
therefore, functional studies focus almost exclusively on the comparison 
of American and European legal systems. That certainly neglects prob-
lems and solutions of more remote societies. However, it is probably 
more telling about the attitudes and agendas of contemporary compara-
 
 33. William Ewald, The Jurisprudential Approach to Comparative Law: A Field 
Guide to “Rats,” 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 701, 703–04 (1998) [hereinafter Ewald, A Field 
Guide to “Rats”]. 
 34. See, e.g., Ichiro Kitamura, Brèves réflexions sur la méthode de comparaison 
franco-japonaise [Brief Reflections on the French-Japanese Comparative Method], 47 
REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARÉ [R.I.D.C.] 861 (1995) (Fr.); Rodolfo Sacco, 
Mute Law, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 455 (1995). 
 35. See Bernhard Großfeld, Sinn und Methode der Rechtsvergleichung, in 
FESTSCHRIFT FÜR OTTO SANDROCK 329, 339 (Klaus Peter Berger ed., 2000) (F.R.G); J. 
Kohler, Ueber die Methode der Rechtsvergleichung, in 28 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR DAS PRIVAT- 
UND ÖFFENTLICHE RECHT DER GEGENWART 273–84 (1901) (F.R.G). See also Kischel, 
supra note 13, at 14. 
 36. LEONTIN-JEAN CONSTANTINESCO, TRAITE DE DROIT COMPARE, TOME III: LA 
SCIENCE DES DROITS COMPARES 63 (1983) (Fr.) [hereinafter CONSTANTINESCO, TOME III]; 
Nora V. Demleitner, Combating Legal Ethnocentrism: Comparative Law Sets Bounda-
ries, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 737, 741–44 (1999); Michaels, supra note 7, at 107–09. 
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tists than about the theoretical limits of their method. Functionalism, as 
such, has—as we will see—reductionist tendencies, but it does not com-
mand or foster ethnocentricity. 
D. Real Problems with the Functional Method 
However, some problems are inherent to the functional method and are 
not only issues of implementation. They can be divided into two catego-
ries: (1) axiomatic ones that originate from the three presuppositions that 
underpin the functional method; and (2) shortcomings in its operation. 
1. Axiomatic Problems 
a. First Premise: Law as a Solution of Problems 
The first basic assumption of functionalism, that law is a rationally de-
veloped entity fulfilling a specific purpose,37 is a weak starting point. 
Too many factors that in practice obscure the effectiveness of legal rules 
are left out of the picture. Saying that law solves problems, for example, 
presupposes also that it is capable of doing so. That is not always the 
case. There are bodies of law that are dysfunctional in one of four ways. 
Firstly, there might be situations where law is enacted for purely sym-
bolical reasons. For instance, a legislator may want to be seen as doing 
something rather than actually being committed to tackling a problem, as 
occurred with the German legislation on combat dogs in 2000.38 Sec-
ondly, norms that would usefully address social problems may be absent 
in a particular system. Especially strong ideologies might hinder the law 
in answering social problems effectively, as socialism did with the right 
of workers to strike.39 Thirdly, a legal institution may serve ends or ob-
tain results that were neither foreseen nor desired by its framers (“unin-
tended functions”). The main instance of dysfunctionality, however, is 
that a legal institution might have lost its particular function altogether so 
that its existence can only be explained historically. Alan Watson has 
examined the evolution of the rules of private law in various “civil law” 
countries.40 He found that while underlying social, economic, and politi-
 
 37. See supra Part II.A.   
 38. See Rudolf Wassermann, Gesetzgebungsethik?—Der plötzliche Eifer des Norm-
gebers beim Kampf gegen die “Kampfhunde,” 35 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 
2650 (2000) (F.R.G). 
 39. See CONSTANTINESCO, TOME III, supra note 36, at 65. 
 40. ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW 107–
18 (2d ed. 1993); Alan Watson, Legal Culture v. Legal Tradition, in EPISTEMOLOGY AND 
METHODOLOGY OF COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 3, at 1, 3; see also JOHN BELL, FRENCH 
LEGAL CULTURES 17 (2001); LEONTIN-JEAN CONSTANTINESCO, TRAITÉ DE DROIT 
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cal circumstances have changed, entire bodies of law, mostly from the 
Corpus Iuris Civilis, have been transplanted, essentially unaltered, from 
society to society. Any interesting connection between the social context 
of those countries and the rules of their private law remained elusive; 
legal borrowings often proved inappropriate. One has to conclude that 
the notion of law as mirror of society is, in fact, just a “mirage.” Not all 
legal norms and doctrines are functionally related to social life because 
they run counter to any conceivable need or interest. 
A reversed image of the dysfunctionality problem is the multifunction-
ality dilemma. Functional studies tend to regard the function of law as a 
monolithic, independent entity. They focus on “the” function of legal 
institutions.41 However, a specific legal institution can have simultane-
ously diverse functions.42 There might be universal social requirements 
that need answering. These wants, however, are often accompanied and 
even eclipsed by needs that are specific to a particular society. Corre-
spondingly, law has not only generic functions, but also at the same time 
national or regional functions.43 A contract, for example, universally se-
cures the parties’ expectations of performance. In a market-based econ-
omy, it also allows the parties to administer autonomously their eco-
nomic relations; whereas in a command economy, a contract is a tool to 
fulfill the goals set out by the plan.44 Is that really functionally equiva-
lent? A study by Folke Schmidt has revealed that collective labor con-
tracts have as many as five distinct functions.45 These functions are fur-
thermore dependent on the specific institutional setting in which they are 
performed. Institutions and structures of a society reflect its unique his-
torical experience and its established ways of working. Bell rightly ex-
 
COMPARÉ, TOME II: LA MÉTHODE COMPARATIVE 86, 322 (1974) (Fr.) [hereinafter 
CONSTANTINESCO, TOME II]; Ewald, A Field Guide to “Rats,” supra note 33, at 702; D. 
Kokkini-Iatridou, Some Methodological Aspects of Comparative Law: The Third Part of 
a (Pre-)Paradigm, 33 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 143, 160 (1986). 
 41. See supra Part II.A; ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 12, at 44. 
 42. See Oliver Brand, Grundfragen der Rechtsvergleichung—Ein Leitfaden für die 
Wahlfachprüfung, JUS 1082, 1087 (2003) (F.R.G); Jonathan Hill, Comparative Law, 
Legal Reform and Legal Theory, 9 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 101, 108 (1989); Peters & 
Schwenke, supra note 5, at 828; Rudolf Schlesinger, The Common Core of Legal Sys-
tems, in LEGAL ESSAYS IN HONOR OF HESSEL N. YNTEMA 65, 68–69 (Kurt H. Nadelmann 
& Arthur T. von Mehren eds., 1961). 
 43. CONSTANTINESCO, TOME III, supra note 36, at 63–64; John Bell, Comparative 
Public Law, in COMPARATIVE LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY 235, 243 (Andrew Harding & 
Esin Örücü eds., 2002). 
 44. See Brand, supra note 42, at 1087. 
 45. Folke Schmidt, The Need for a Multi-Axial Method in Comparative Law, in 
FESTSCHRIFT FÜR KONRAD ZWEIGERT 525, 533–534 (Herbert Bernstein ed., 1981). 
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plained the distinctiveness of constitutional provisions in Europe by the 
unique problems of the past that the respective jurisdictions wanted to 
deal with, e.g. Germany with regard to the failure of the Weimar Repub-
lic.46
Concentrating on one generic function as the delimiting trait of the 
“social problem” under scrutiny consequently ignores alternative concep-
tualizations that could be established when choosing another function as 
the tertium comparationis. Functionalism therefore runs the risk of mis-
comprehending or even overlooking the institution’s cumulative contri-
bution to the respective legal system. 
b. Second Premise: Similarity of Problems 
As our look at the roots of functionalism in the early twentieth century 
has shown, the method was not designed as a basis for all comparative 
studies. Especially its second presupposition, that problems are similar 
across legal systems, imposes severe operational limitations upon it.47 
The implied universalism of this premise confines comparatists to deal-
ing with problems defined in similar practical terms. As soon as one sys-
tem attributes a different social significance to a particular problem, the 
similarity of function (and the comparability of “solutions”) ends. 
Acknowledging this, functionalists frankly admit that there are “blind 
spots,” areas of the law, e.g., the law of wills or same-sex marriages, 
which are “system conditioned” to an extent so that they are beyond the 
reach of their method.48 Even if you accept this proviso, the functional 
method is deficit because it neither offers a precise definition of the term 
“system conditioned,” nor shows a way in which the comparatist may 
distinguish between “system conditioned” problems and those that are 
not.49 This shortcoming has a wider implication. If functionalism is not 
capable of dealing with individual “system conditioned” institutions, 
how can it investigate the socio-economic relativity of the legal system 
as a whole? 
Another “blind spot” of functionalism is its lack of causal explanation. 
By definition, the method reverses the usual order of cause and (social) 
effect by explaining things in terms of what happens afterward, not what 
came before. This prevents functionalists, for example, from examining 
filial relationships between legal systems and institutions properly, be-
 
 46. Bell, supra note 43, at 241–42. 
 47. See PETER DE CRUZ, COMPARATIVE LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD 230–33 (2d ed. 
1999); Husa, supra note 7, at 424; van Reenen, supra note 4, at 188–89. 
 48. ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 12, at 39. 
 49. Efstathios K. Banakas, Some Thoughts on the Method of Comparative Law: The 
Concept of Law Revisited, 1981 ARCHIVES FOR PHIL. L. & SOC. PHIL. 289, 292 (1981). 
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cause, as Alan Watson has demonstrated, cause/effect relationships be-
tween a transplant and its foreign antecedent are fundamental for studies 
in the migration of legal ideas.50 The general lack of structural-causal 
explanations forces functionalists either to reduce the explanatory claims 
of their theory or to deny all non-technical attributes of the law, neither 
of which they want. 
Even in those areas in which functionalism can work, its second prem-
ise severely limits its operation by fostering reductionism.51 The func-
tionalists’ reluctance to properly establish the comparability of the prob-
lem sociologically restricts their comparisons to grand, superficial simi-
larities. Indeed, it is hard to believe that many legal problems are the 
same in two societies except on a technical level. To assume the opposite 
seemed “utter dilettantism” to Kohler.52 The underlying political, moral, 
and social values in different systems simply vary too much. Functional-
ists do not seem to realize this because they generally fail to discuss how 
one establishes “likeness” and “sameness” as a starting point for com-
parison. Further, they do not propose a method for finding and evaluating 
differences, however small, among “like” phenomena. Partly as a result 
of this, the functional approach is unable to solve the problem of appar-
ently similar social and economic conditions producing radically differ-
ent legal solutions, or even no solutions at all. 
c. Third Premise: Problems Are Solved in a Similar Way 
The heuristic principle of the praesumptio similitudinis, finally, is a 
further incentive to concentrate uncritically on similarities and thereby 
deepen the reductionist tendency of functionalism. It seduces them into 
neglecting the cultural-historical specificity of legal systems as long as, 
generally, their solutions to “problems” coincide. The assumption of 
similarity works reasonably well within the same cultural sphere. If 
comparisons, however, take place between culturally more remote sys-
tems, it becomes increasingly pointless, which the existence of institutes 
such as ordre public in the field of conflict of laws suggest.53 Further 
exemptions are necessitated by the problem, that there are institutions for 
 
 50. Alan Watson, From Legal Transplants to Legal Formants, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 
469, 469–70 (1995). 
 51. From a historical perspective, see WATSON, supra note 40, at 4–5; from a cultural-
ist perspective, see Vivian Grosswald Curran, Cultural Immersion, Difference and Cate-
gories in U.S. Comparative Law, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 43, 61 (1998); from a critical legal 
studies perspective, see Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons, supra note 20, at 436; van 
Reenen, supra note 4, at 191. 
 52. Kohler, supra note 35, at 275.  
 53. Graziadei, supra note 10, at 102. 
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which equivalents are not found in all systems, e.g., polygamous mar-
riages. Some problems, such as marrying a second cousin, pose a prob-
lem for some legal systems, but not for others. That is why functionalists 
tend to apply the praesumptio only to legal subjects that are relatively 
“apolitical” and unimpressed “by moral views or values,”54 such as con-
tract law. But can we really assume that there is such a thing as “apoliti-
cal law” in an age where policy issues such as consumer protection per-
meate all fields of the law, including the law of contracts? Is it not that 
we have to accept that law is nothing else but successful politics? 
Finally, the presumption of similarity questionably encourages the 
view that legal and extra-legal regulation are essentially the same, as 
long as they fulfill the same function.55 Yet, in legal theory, it makes a 
difference whether individuals are free to discover their obligations for 
themselves or whether their obligations are imposed by law. Ignoring 
this hides a vital issue of comparison: the way legal systems allocate 
regulation between law and custom. 
2. Operational Problems 
a. Pseudo-Factuality 
On a non-axiomatic level, functionalism is in deficit, too, by maintain-
ing a “factual approach”56 to comparative law, while in fact not doing so. 
Functional studies begin by defining a social problem.57 A social prob-
lem, however, is a factual situation plus the value judgment that this 
situation causes consequences that need to be remedied. This value 
judgment is contingent. The answer to what makes a factual situation a 
problem can be different from one legal system to another. It may de-
pend, for example, upon who finds a particular factual situation “prob-
lematic.” It makes a difference whether a particular situation in one legal 
system is considered problematic by a lobby group, in another by aca-
demics, and in a third by a large majority of the public. Functionalism 
does not care for this contingency. Therefore, its claim of neutrality, 
which hinges on the claim of being a factual approach, cannot be upheld. 
b. Contemporality 
Another operational shortcoming of the functionalist method is that it 
is nearly exclusively occupied with studying contemporal legal problems 
 
 54. ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 12, at 40. 
 55. Id. at 38. 
 56. Peters & Schwenke, supra note 5, at 808. 
 57. See supra Part II.A. 
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(horizontal or synchronous comparisons).58 It neither creates incentives 
to look at how a problem was solved in the past,59 nor does it care to 
compare legal systems or institutions that are remote from each other in 
time (vertical or diachronous comparisons). Though difficult and not 
universally exercisable, diachronous comparisons are possible as long as 
the institutions or legal systems under scrutiny have enough characteris-
tics in common to validate a comparison.60 Other comparative disci-
plines, such as comparative politics, make frequent use of such compari-
sons.61 Studies like Buckland and McNair’s Roman Law and Common 
Law elucidate that diachronous comparisons also yield valuable knowl-
edge for lawyers.62  
Not to examine how a particular legal system addressed a certain prob-
lem in the past is cumbersome, where this jurisdiction adopted a specific 
solution first and opted for another solution later. In such a case, func-
tionalists will often neglect the former solution because it is discontinu-
ous. Even where an institution stands the test of time, the functionalist 
will regularly overlook that it may have had additional or alternative 
functions in the past. Nearly every institution serves functions at some 
time in a given society that have been ignored in other times. It has, 
however, the potential to perform each of these functions even if in the 
given concrete contemporal case, it does not do so. This potential is im-
portant for understanding the significance of a legal institution, which 
functionalists will regularly fail to notice. 
E. Conclusion 
The pragmatically motivated functional method has been a useful 
guide for establishing comparative law as a discipline. It still has its vir-
tues and valuable applications today. As a model for all comparative 
studies, however, functionalism is no longer a good fit because it is too 
limited in its application by its premises and operational problems. 
Merely abandoning the praesumptio similtudinis, as arguably its most 
 
 58. CONSTANTINESCO, TOME III, supra note 36, at 42. 
 59. Gerber, supra note 17, at 206. 
 60. CONSTANTINESCO, TOME II, supra note 40, at 46; Sir Frederick Pollock, The His-
tory of Comparative Jurisprudence, 5 J. SOC’Y COMP. LEGIS. 74, 76 (1903). 
 61. See, e.g., Joshua B. Forrest, Asynchronic Comparisons: Weak States in Post-
Colonial Africa and Mediaeval Europe, in MATTEI DOGAN & ALI KAZANCIGIL, 
COMPARING NATIONS: CONCEPTS, STRATEGIES, SUBSTANCE 260 (1994). 
 62. W.W. BUCKLAND & ARNOLD D. MCNAIR, ROMAN LAW AND COMMON LAW: A 
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controversial presumption,63 cannot save the method. The objections to 
the remaining presuppositions are too serious. 
III. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES 
Towards the end of the twentieth century, the growing dissatisfaction 
with functionalism enabled new approaches to comparative law to chal-
lenge its claim for methodological dominance. Three of these trends are 
worth mentioning: Comparative Law and Economics, Comparative Law 
and Culture, and Critical Comparative Law. They shall be examined in 
turn to see whether they can present a viable alternative to functionalism. 
I will not present historical comparative law as a separate method be-
cause the historical dimension of law is, in fact, an integral part of every 
meaningful comparative study.64
A. Mattei—Comparative Law and Economics 
While comparative lawyers increasingly employ disciplines such as 
history, anthropology, and sociology, until recently economic theory has 
been largely ignored. Only in the mid-1990s did Law and Economics 
claim a share in comparative studies. It promises to benefit comparative 
research by providing a degree of measurement to its statements: eco-
nomic efficiency Comparative Law and Economics scholars strive to 
distinguish themselves from mainstream law and economics insofar as 
they claim a more neutral role for the discipline as an analytical, rather 
than a normative tool.65 This, however, is merely an ill-concealed lip 
service. As their studies reveal, in fact, they aim to operate both at the 
levels of descriptive and normative analysis.66
1. Operation 
Analytically, Comparative Law and Economics seeks to begin the 
comparison from a “neutral scale” that can be validated by observable 
data: economic efficiency. The term “efficiency,” in its comparative 
sense, is defined as “whatever legal arrangement ‘they’ have that ‘we’ 
wish to have because by having it they are better off”67—in terms of 
lesser waste, lower transaction costs, better resource allocation, or greater 
 
 63. Husa, supra note 7, at 424. 
 64. ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 12, at 8. See Örücü, supra note 15, at 63–65. 
 65. UGO MATTEI, COMPARATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS 7 (1997). 
 66. Id. at 123; Ugo Mattei & Fabrizio Cafaggi, Comparative Law and Economics, in 
1 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND LAW 346, 347 (Peter Newman 
ed., 1998). 
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freedom for individuals to interact.68 Mattei’s archetypal methodology 
begins by building a model of what he hypothesizes is an efficient legal 
institution.69 This blueprint, according to him, needs to be abstracted 
from the pool of solutions offered by existing legal systems under the 
presumption that all of the relevant empirical data for the assessment of 
efficiency are available. 
In a second analytical step, law and economics comparatists then com-
pare their model to the real-world alternatives (i.e., substantive rules) of 
different legal systems.70 When faced with departures from the efficient 
model, which will frequently be found, they seek to explain why this in-
efficiency occurs. A proper analysis is very complex because law and 
economics comparatists accept that efficiency is context-dependent.71 
Even where market structure and consumer preferences are similar, the 
same legal rule may be efficient or inefficient depending on the institu-
tional and cultural background to which it refers. Less efficient solutions 
can be justified by offering some non-distributional benefit that out-
weighs the gains that the efficient solution would have generated. In 
judging the overall efficiency of a legal system, the comparatist further-
more has to watch out for institutions that can work as efficiency restor-
ing substitutes, where inefficiency is diagnosed. In this way, comparative 
scholars can isolate and evaluate variables that contribute to or detract 
from the relative efficiency of the systems under comparison. 
The third step of Comparative Law and Economics transcends from the 
analytical to the normative level. After having identified and explained 
the deviations from the efficient model, the comparatist is supposed to 
define the conditions for policy changes in order to get closer to the 
model in those instances where the reasons for distance do not appear 
justified.72 Such conditions are determined by the transaction costs of 
changing a given historically prefixed routine. For example, while cer-
tain aspects of trust law, as developed in the common law tradition, have 
efficiency advantages in the case of bankruptcy over their counterparts 
available in civil law, the costs of changing the general structure of prop-
 
 68. Dieter Krimphove, Der Einsatz der ökonomischen Analyse des Rechts als not-
wendiges Instrument der Europäischen Rechtsvergleichung, 39 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG 185, 189 (1998) (F.R.G). 
 69. MATTEI, supra note 65, at 182; see also JAN SMITS, THE MAKING OF EUROPEAN 
PRIVATE LAW: TOWARD A IUS COMMUNE EUROPAEUM AS A MIXED LEGAL SYSTEM 61 
(Nicole Kornet trans., Intersentia 2002). 
 70. MATTEI, supra note 65, at 182. 
 71. See Krimphove, supra note 68, at 191; Mattei & Cafaggi, supra note 66, at 347. 
 72. Mattei & Cafaggi, supra note 66, at 347. 
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erty rights to accommodate trusts might outweigh the benefits of such an 
introduction.73
As we can see by this example, Comparative Law and Economics fo-
cuses on developments in the relationship between legal systems, i.e., 
convergence, divergence, and the occurrence of legal transplants.74 It 
seeks to explain convergence and divergence as a result of competition 
between legal systems. Legal systems are believed to function as markets 
for the supply of different solutions for a specific problem.75 If transac-
tion costs were zero, then law would be freely transplantable (free 
movement of legal rules) and would evolve naturally toward the most 
efficient rule.76 Legal diversity (transplantation resistance)—according to 
Comparative Law and Economics—results from the transaction costs of 
tradition, culture, and ideology.77
2. Development 
Law and Economics originated in the late 1950s in the United States, 
and dominated the legal discourse there during the 1960s and ‘70s under 
Coase and, later, Posner.78 Progressively it found its way into other coun-
tries. Its appeal “at home,” however, began to wither when Ugo Mattei 
and Dieter Krimphove paved the path for its application to comparative 
studies in the 1990s.79 For a proper evaluation of Comparative Law and 
Economics, it is important to note that the intellectual history of this 
variant of law and economics is curiously longer than that of its parent. 
Technically, Comparative Law and Economics, in its search for the “ef-
ficient solution of a given problem,” is a narrowed and specified version 
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of functionalism.80 It “radicalizes” this method by focusing on one par-
ticular function only: the rule’s or institution’s efficiency.81  
The second source of inspiration for Comparative Law and Economics 
is the work of Gustav Radbruch. It was Radbruch who first maintained 
that when comparing two comparanda, this could only be by reference to 
a third, constant element.82 According to Radbruch, this common point 
of reference has to be a supra-national legal system, an objective, 
“higher” or “natural” law (“richtiges Recht”). For adherents of Compara-
tive Law and Economics, the “efficient” rule is this higher or natural law. 
3. False Trails of Criticism 
Naturally, not everybody agrees on the existence of such a kind of 
“higher law.” A frequent reservation against Comparative Law and Eco-
nomics is that it relies on simplistic presuppositions drawn from neoclas-
sical economics.83 This criticism is worthwhile, but it only disqualifies 
Comparative Law and Economics based on neoclassical models and not 
the method as such. The neo-institutional movement in economics allows 
for observing the institutional settings of human interaction and their im-
pact on transaction costs.84 Behavioral Economics employs social sci-
ences to rectify the inaccurate assumptions in traditional “Law and Eco-
nomics” models by adopting a more realistic idea of man.85 Conse-
quently, there are viable alternative theoretical foundations for Compara-
tive Law and Economics. 
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4. Real Problems 
There are, however, limits to Comparative Law and Economics, which 
disqualify it as a central method for comparative studies. The most fun-
damental objection is that—as its development has shown—it is a mere 
variant of functionalism.86 That makes Comparative Law and Economics 
vulnerable to the same objections put forth against functionalism in its 
broader sense. Furthermore, its focus on efficiency as the sole function of 
law invites additional criticism. 
Mattei’s idea of a neutral model as a tertium comparationis is appeal-
ing, not because a defined, objective point of reference is regarded as a 
logical necessity of comparative methodology as Radbruch (erroneously) 
believed,87 but because it “purges” the comparative process from precon-
ceptual bias. In order to be neutral and have such a purifying effect, the 
comparatum must not be loaded with preconceptions itself. However, it 
is doubtful whether that is true for “efficiency.” 
a. Ambiguity 
A first problem with this term is its ambiguity. Efficiency can refer to 
“partial equilibrium solutions,” i.e., pursuing an efficient outcome for a 
particular problem in a particular market; but it can also mean “general 
equilibria,” i.e., efficient solutions for an entire economic system.88 The 
comparatist is not told which of these scenarios to rely upon when build-
ing “efficient models.” The reason for this might be that both equilibria 
are indeterminate within themselves. Efficient solutions in partial equi-
librium situations cannot be defined unambiguously for logical reasons 
because they are path-dependent89 and may become inefficient once one 
takes into account third parties or collateral effects to other sectors.90 To 
seek general equilibrium efficiencies is technically impracticable for the 
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comparatist because of the enormous information requirements that it 
would place on him or her.91
b. Non-Neutrality 
Even worse, efficiency as a criterion is not only ambiguous, but also 
partisan. Efficiency analysis is essentially a dynamic cost-benefit analy-
sis. It does not look statically at a certain provision and asks whether this 
rule is “efficient.” Instead, it examines collective decisions (e.g., a 
change in legal rules) and asks, under the predominant Kaldor-Hicks 
test,92 whether they generate sufficient gains to their beneficiaries so as 
to hypothetically compensate the losers and render the latter fully indif-
ferent to the change but still have some gains left over for themselves. 
This test contains the seed of non-neutrality in the form of the so-called 
offer-asking problem. Kelman was the first to observe that people gener-
ally have a greater concern for and attachment to things as they are com-
pared to things as they could be.93 As a result, people will ask for a 
higher price when they have to give up something (asking price) than 
what they would be willing to pay when bound to acquire the same good 
(offer price). This difference in price matters to efficiency because it ren-
ders the determination of the respective gains and losses of winners and 
losers dependent on hidden value judgments. The offer-asking problem 
even creates room to argue about who is a winner and who is a loser of a 
proposed change. At first blush, the application of the offer-asking prob-
lem to efficiency’s test—that winners must be able to bribe losers—
would measure the bribe at its offer price and the loss at its asking 
price.94 Other law and economics scholars, however, have interpreted 
win and loss just the other way around.95 Neither position can be said to 
be wrong. The choice to measure win and loss at the offer price or the 
asking price is a question of perspective and correspondingly a question 
of policy: the winners from change are the losers from no-change. If effi-
 
 91. Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 
STAN. L. REV. 387, 395 (1981); Rizzo, supra note 90, at 641–42. 
 92. For the test and the rival Pareto test, see MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF 
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 7, 19–21 (1993). 
 93. Mark Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and Ideology in the 
Coase Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 669, 678–95 (1979). 
 94. Thomas C. Heller, The Importance of Normative Decision-Making: The Limita-
tions of Legal Economics as a Basis for a Liberal Jurisprudence—As Illustrated by the 
Regulation of Vacation Home Development, 1976 WIS. L. REV. 385, 395–96 (1976). 
 95. Richard S. Markovits, The Causes and Policy Significance of Pareto Resource 
Misallocation: A Checklist for Micro-Economic Policy Analysis, 28 STAN. L. REV. 1, 2–3, 
n.4 (1976) (measuring the winners’ gains at their asking price and the losers’ losses at 
their offer price). 
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ciency therefore inevitably involves value judgments, it cannot serve as 
the neutral tertium comparationis that Comparative Law and Economics 
requires it to be. 
Another expression of the inherent dependency of efficiency on value 
judgments is the problem of multiple optima. Comparative Law and 
Economics suggest an efficient model as comparatum against which to 
assess real-world legal institutions. Such a model cannot be built with 
reference to efficiency alone. If transaction costs are low, i.e., almost any 
agreement that is to the mutual benefit of the parties concerned is made, 
any assignment of rights will lead to an efficient outcome. Winners and 
losers of a proposed change in the law would always bargain for the effi-
cient solution.96 This means that there is a set of efficient solutions, 
rather than a single efficient outcome. The choice of any of them is a 
matter of value judgment unrelated to efficiency. The situation is no dif-
ferent when transaction costs are numerous and/or high. Here, it is the 
lawyer-economist’s task to manipulate entitlements and redistribute units 
of factors until the allocation of resources resembles the efficient solution 
found in a world with no/low transaction costs.97 This is impossible to 
achieve with reference to efficiency alone, because, as we have just seen, 
even in a world with no transaction costs there is no single efficient solu-
tion. Therefore, under no circumstances, can law reformers use effi-
ciency alone to support any particular program of rules. 
Even proponents of a law and economics approach to comparative law 
are reluctantly realizing how political and value-laden efficiency in fact 
is. Mattei, for example, complains about a severe “American-centric” 
provincialism in the discipline.98 Indeed, law and economics scholars 
mostly work under the rather uncritical assumption of the American in-
stitutional background; they seem to assume that “there is, whether by 
conscious choice or by social necessity, a strong tendency for the 
[American] common law to adopt efficient rules.”99 Mattei tries to tackle 
the problem by establishing the context-dependency of efficiency. If effi-
ciency, however, is context-dependent, there is no way to work with it as 
a neutral tertium comparationis. 
 
 96. DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, LAW’S ORDER 39 (2000); Kennedy, supra note 91, at 395, 
441–42. 
 97. Kennedy, supra note 91, at 444. 
 98. MATTEI, supra note 65, at xii, 69–70. 
 99. Id. at 125. 
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c. Distortedness 
Efficiency is also unsuitable as a scale for comparative studies because 
it distorts the perspective of the comparatist in two ways. First, efficiency 
is a transient phenomenon. Even slight changes in the economic circum-
stances invalidate findings because what is considered to be efficient in 
today’s economic environment might be inefficient in that of tomorrow. 
Therefore, efficiency is oriented toward short-term results. While this 
might be acceptable in a (reactive) common law jurisdiction, it does not 
agree with legal systems based on codification with their higher need for 
legal certainty. Secondly, efficiency analysis is purely concerned with 
resource allocation.100 Distributive issues, i.e., all non-efficiency consid-
erations, are ignored or marginalized. Such a focus on an exclusive crite-
rion under which to evaluate laws is a decidedly reductionist view of the 
law and its role in society. It breathes new life into Gerber’s fear that 
functional comparisons of any kind produce particularist knowledge. 
Opting for Comparative Law and Economics instead of functionalism, 
would therefore change things from bad to worse. 
B. Legrand—Comparative Law as Hermeneutic Exercise 
With Comparative Law and Economics apparently unable to overcome 
the objections against functionalism, we have to turn our eyes to other 
contenders. Since the mid-1990s, conventional comparative law has been 
challenged by members of the culturalist movement.101 Their thinking 
orbits around the term “legal culture,” which means “those historically 
conditioned, deeply rooted attitudes about the nature of law and about the 
proper structure and operation of a legal system that are at large in the 
society.”102 From this starting point, culturalists essentially contend that 
legal rules are embedded in local dimensions of the law. Each legal cul-
ture is a unique, culturally contingent product, which is incommensur-
able and untranslatable except through a deep understanding of the sur-
rounding social context. Pierre Legrand is the prime proponent of this 
movement in comparative law. 
 
 100. Paul H. Brietzke, New Wrinkles in Law . . . and Economics, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 
105, 127–29 (1998); Peters & Schwenke, supra note 5, at 829. 
 101. See, e.g., PIERRE LEGRAND, FRAGMENTS ON LAW-AS-CULTURE 27–34 (1999). See 
generally ERHARD BLANKENBERG ET AL., COMPARING LEGAL CULTURES 1 (David Nelken 
ed., 1997) (composing a collection of works by various authors “to consider the possibili-
ties and advantages of using comparative work . . . to clarify the meaning and character 
of legal culture”); J.C. SMITH ET AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL CULTURES (Csaba Varga ed., 
1992). 
 102. JOHN H. MERRYMAN & DAVID S. CLARK, COMPARATIVE LAW: WESTERN 
EUROPEAN AND LATIN AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEMS 28 (1978). 
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1. Operation 
While functionalism is concentrated on finding similarities and con-
vergences, Legrand’s basic experience is that of plurality and difference. 
He argues that comparative law is not a search for function, but a herme-
neutic exercise (démarche herméneutique).103 Functionalism, according 
to his view, was only partially successful in penetrating the façade of 
language. What a rule does “functionally,” he believes, is yet another 
layer of the surface appearance of law. The task of the comparatist is to 
delve beyond that technical surface and to uncover what the rule signifies 
in terms of its political, social, economic, and ideological context. 
For Legrand, the specificity of legal traditions and cultures is central. 
He sees their structures and values as contained in language, which is not 
always translatable, and builds therefore an insurmountable framework 
of contingent ways of legal reasoning.104 Comparative law is about 
“finding what is significantly different” abroad. Accordingly, it can only 
be descriptive, not normative. Foreign law may only be used as a tool to 
encourage criticism of the presuppositions of one’s own tradition, but not 
to provide a model for its reform because each legal tradition is requisite 
and irreplaceable. Methodologically, the explanation of the deep cultural 
and mental structures expressed by legal texts becomes the main aim of 
comparative law. This “hermeneutic exercise” is, in fact, a search for the 
cultural, moral, and linguistic relativism of law. How that search is to be 
conducted, however, is merely hinted at.105 After having established a 
linguistic framework that at least allows a proper perception of foreign 
law, the comparatist has to carefully lift in his or her description the lat-
ter’s cultural veils one by one, paying special attention to decision mak-
ing structures, i.e., legal actors and the way they interact and reason. 
Legrand can only find limited applications for comparative law be-
cause of his focus on perspective. He is “anti-foundationalist,” i.e., re-
jects the belief that there is a universal truth.106 Instead, he claims human 
knowledge can, at best, be partial in nature and only validated within a 
specific context; the comparatist, in other words, cannot escape from his 
 
 103. PIERRE LEGRAND, LE DROIT COMPARÉ [COMPARATIVE LAW] 31 (1999) (Fr.); Pi-
erre Legrand, The Impossibility of “Legal Transplants,” 4 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. COMP. L. 
111, 123 (1997) [hereinafter Legrand, The Impossibility of “Legal Transplants”]; see 
also Husa, supra note 7, at 439–42. 
 104. Legrand, How to Compare Now, supra note 28, at 234–35, 240; Legrand, The 
Impossibility of “Legal Transplants,” supra note 103, at 123. 
 105. Pierre Legrand, Comparer, 48 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARÉ 
[R.I.D.C.] 279, at 285, 293 (1996) (Fr.). 
 106. Janet E. Ainsworth, Categories and Culture: On the “Rectification of Names” in 
Comparative Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 19, 25 (1997). 
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or her cultural framework.107 This belief, that not only law, but also all 
knowledge is culturally and historically contingent, poses an immense 
methodological hurdle for comparative studies. 
2. Development 
A look at the roots of Legrand’s approach provides an explanation. 
Historically, it is based on forethinkers, who were biased against com-
parative law, and philosophically, it is rooted on movements that are 
weak in methodology-building. 
When Legrand regards legal cultures as unique “spiritual creations” of 
the community, he reaches back to Montesquieu, who proclaimed the 
dependency of law on local conditions as early as 1748 with his seminal 
De l’Esprit des Lois.108 Legrand can also be seen as an unintentional suc-
cessor of the German historical school of law that considered law to be 
the manifestation of the people’s national spirit (“Volksgeist”) and 
thereby particular to every nation—an organic product of society which 
has to be watched for and discovered, rather than made or tampered 
with.109 Even though the contribution of its founder, Savigny, to com-
parative law is underestimated,110 this school was more than ambivalent 
towards comparative legal studies.111
Theoretically, Legrand’s works are based on two different schools, cul-
turalism and deconstruction. The banner of culturalism was raised in the 
early 1980s by Stuart Hall as a countermovement to structuralism and 
universalism.112 The main objective of culturalism was to allow societies 
to be evaluated in their uniqueness and their complex social and political 
context.113 The dark side of this perspective is that societies, like indi-
viduals, all of a sudden seemed incommensurable if not incompatible. 
 
 107. Legrand, How to Compare Now, supra note 28, at 308–09. 
 108. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 103–05 (David Wallace Carrithers trans., U. 
Cal. Press) (1977).  
 109.  See James Knudson, The Influence of the German Concepts of Volksgeist and 
Zeitgeist on the Thought and Jurisprudence of Oliver Wendell Holmes, 11 J. TRANSNAT’L 
L. & POL’Y 407, 409 (2002); JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 28 
(Stan. U. Press) (2d ed. 1985).  
 110. Brand, supra note 42, at 1085. 
 111. Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (I), supra note 2, at 2012–42; Peters & 
Schwenke, supra note 5, at 806 n.30. 
 112. See Stuart Hall, Cultural Studies: Two Paradigms, 2 MEDIA, CULTURE AND SOC’Y 
57 (1980).    
 113. See JOCHEN HÖRISCH, THEORIE-APOTHEKE: EINE HANDREICHUNG ZU DEN 
HUMANWISSENSCHAFTLICHEN THEORIEN DER LETZTEN FÜNFZIG JAHRE, EINSCHLIEßLICH 
IHRER RISIKEN UND NEBENWIRKUNGEN 70–71 (2004) (F.R.G). 
2007] CONCEPTUAL COMPARISONS 431 
                                                                                                            
Accordingly, the diversity of cultures became sacrosanct. Research there-
fore had to diversify as well, often to such an extent that a fruitful dia-
logue was hardly viable anymore. 
Culturalism found a natural ally in deconstruction,114 which in turn 
stands on the shoulders of hermeneutics. The latter is concerned with 
human understanding and the interpretation of texts. Gadamer, one of 
Heidegger’s disciples, first applied hermeneutics to legal texts in order to 
understand them as signifiers of something deeper.115 The French post-
structuralist philosopher Derrida, whom Legrand refers to frequently, 
also borrowed from Heidegger and transformed his form of textual 
analysis (“Dekonstruktion”) into a tool of “destructive criticism.”116 Cen-
tral to deconstruction is the French neologism “différance.” In simple 
terms, this means that rather than seeking commonality, simplicity, and 
unifying principles, deconstruction emphasizes difference, complexity, 
and non-self-identity.117 A deconstructive interpretation of law aims to 
unveil hidden inconsistencies and biases by demonstrating how a seem-
ingly unitary concept contains different or opposing meanings. Accord-
ing to Derrida, however, deconstruction never condensed to either a 
school or a method, but is merely an occurrence within the text itself.118  
3. Problems 
The upshot of Legrand’s “method” is total incomparability across his-
tory and culture. He simply negates the mere existence of things such as 
legal transplants119 or convergence of legal systems.120 Any cross-
cultural comparisons are labeled “superficial.” One wonders whether that 
is just over-conscious thinking or, in fact, the expression of an agenda to 
pose as many obstacles to the normative use of comparative law as pos-
sible. Cultures are, as Legrand admits, not hermetic, closed, or immuta-
ble entities.121 They influence and infiltrate each other (Americaniza-
tion!), because unlike individuals, they do not have readily determinable 
boundaries. If boundaries between cultures are blurry, then those of their 
 
 114. See id. at 68. 
 115. HANS-GEORG GADAMER, WAHRHEIT UND METHODE 252 (4th ed. 1975) (F.R.G). 
 116. See HERMAN RAPAPORT, HEIDEGGER AND DERRIDA: REFLECTIONS ON TIME AND 
LANGUAGE 22–23 (1989). 
 117. J.M. Balkin, Deconstruction, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND 
LEGAL THEORY 367, 368–69 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996). 
 118. Id. at 367. 
 119. Legrand, The Impossibility of “Legal Transplants,” supra note 103, at 111–12. 
 120. Pierre Legrand, European Legal Systems Are Not Converging, 45 INT’L & COMP. 
L.Q. 52, 52 (1996); Legrand, How to Compare Now, supra note 28, at 295.  
 121. Legrand, How to Compare Now, supra note 28, at 238, n.26. 
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epistemic and socio-economic background are too. That makes a fruitful 
dialogue between members of a different cultural background possible. 
Certainly, Legrand and other culturalists have commendably elucidated 
shortcomings of functionalist studies in paying due respect to the socio-
cultural context of law, drawing “destructive” strength from their phi-
losophical roots. However, this potential might be exhausted. As pointed 
out above, functionalists today accept that the comparative study of law 
needs to be contextual. Because they also can accommodate this consid-
eration within their theoretical framework, it seems as if all that can be 
done with Legrand’s approach meaningfully, is to “deconstruct the am-
biguities and indeterminacies” within individual comparisons.122 Other-
wise, Legrand’s comparative thoughts have little to offer for actual re-
search-practice in comparative law. “Methodologically,” he wants to 
contextualize the objects of comparison and thereby capture their essence 
as a unique manifestation of the community. This, however, is more a 
goal than a method. One cannot avail oneself of the idea that Legrand, 
like most of the law-as-culture scholars, is still working on a “proto-
methodological” level. He is preoccupied with contemplating the legiti-
macy and the aims of comparative law. In his “Droit comparé,” for ex-
ample, Legrand concentrates on philosophic, epistemological problems 
besetting the discipline. He devotes no space to the history, accomplish-
ments, or methods of the subject. The question of “how to compare now” 
dawns, but it is still superimposed by the question of “why to compare.” 
It is not unlikely that Legrand will never emerge from this state. His 
theoretical sources, culturalism, and deconstruction hardly provide him 
with workable tools for method-building. 
C. Frankenberg—Critical Comparative Law 
A similar fate seems to await Guenter Frankenberg, one of the few 
scholars associated with Critical Legal Studies who pays closer attention 
to questions of comparative methodology. 
1. Operation 
For Frankenberg, the question of method encompasses not only the 
“how,” but also the “why” of comparative studies.123 He negates func-
tionalism’s presumptions of the necessity, functionality, and universality 
of law and aims to transform conventional comparative law into a tool 
for the critique of law by using an analysis of abortion decisions to illus-
 
 122. Husa, supra note 7, at 441–42; Peters & Schwenke, supra note 5, at 812; Riles, 
supra note 20, at 248. 
 123. Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons, supra note 20, at 416, 445. 
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trate his approach. This approach divides the comparative process into 
three steps.124 In the first step, the comparatist is required to scrutinize 
carefully what happens when the multiple facets of a factual situation are 
taken out of their social context and fitted into a legal framework. A sec-
ond step is to elucidate this legal framework by critically analyzing its 
structure (especially the public/private distinctions) and to delve into the 
processes of legal decision-making. The latter opens the door to the po-
litical dimension of law, which Frankenberg sees primarily as a theoreti-
cal instrument for the purpose of gaining, cementing, and justifying the 
exercise of power.125 He thinks that comparatists need to move from tra-
ditional conceptions of legal discourse, such as rights and duties, to the 
politics of the subject studied. For him that is the only way to insure that 
comparative law does not obey hidden political agendas of hegemony 
and domination. In a third step, finally, the comparatist has to reintroduce 
the socio-cultural context that has been lost by “legalizing” a problem. 
To avoid the bias of functionalism, Frankenberg wants comparatists to 
understand their studies as “learning experience[s]” that require “a 
greater sensitivity to the relationship between the self and the other,” and 
“tolerance for ambiguity.”126 They are encouraged to avoid concentrating 
on similarities and to allow differences, especially in the political con-
text, to emerge. To cope with pre-conceptual bias, Frankenberg wants to 
unravel the ties that bind the comparatist to his domestic legal regime. 
Comparative research undertaken so far, he believes, has to be reassessed 
by taking into account the scholars’ motives, interests, and perspectives, 
i.e., the scholars’ legal education, exposure to different legal cultures, 
networks, etc.127 Self-criticism as the prime virtue of the researcher is 
meant to insure that future comparative law produces valuable knowl-
edge. Only then can the comparatist unearth the sub-structural, often un-
articulated, categorizations and silent assumptions of law.128
2. Development 
Frankenberg’s insights have two sources of inspiration. First, like Le-
grand, he is driven by the idea of difference that in Frankenberg’s case is 
loosely inspired by feminist studies and the philosophical theory of lit-
erature. The theme of difference harmonizes well with Frankenberg’s 
second source, the Critical Legal Studies movement. This rather hetero-
 
 124. Id. at 451–52. 
 125. Frankenberg, Stranger than Paradise, supra note 81, at 261–63; see also Frances 
Olsen, The Drama of Comparative Law, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 275, 278 (1997). 
 126. Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons, supra note 20, at 441. 
 127. Id. at 443. 
 128. Id. 
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geneous school, whose crystallization point was a conference at the Uni-
versity of Wisconsin-Madison in 1977, applies ideas of Marx, Marcuse, 
and Adorno to the study of law.129 Of central importance is the idea that 
legal rules and institutions are tilted towards the preservation of en-
trenched interests with wealth and power and therefore are biased against 
the poor and oppressed, especially the working class, women, and people 
of color. Critical Legal Studies flourished in the United States in the 
1980s, but its influence began to fade in the early 1990s.  
3. Problems 
Some scholars sense a “thirst for a more aggressive and dynamic com-
parative law”130 such as Frankenberg’s approach. However, his insights 
have so far not helped to establish a more convincing methodological 
approach to comparative studies than the heavily criticized functional-
ism. Like Legrand, Frankenberg is good at analyzing weaknesses of con-
ventional comparative studies and at further reducing their reach and ex-
planatory power. In addition, his elaboration on the political dimension 
of law and the need for self-reflection provides helpful guidance for the 
comparatist—even though it may divert the focus of research from the 
comparison of laws to the history, epistemology, and politics of com-
parative research itself.131 Again, like Legrand however, Frankenberg 
does not muster the strength to come up with a fully developed counter-
theory to functionalism. His “three step approach” remains “patch-
work”—mainly because the theoretical framework he is working in, 
Critical Legal Studies, does not provide the necessary tools for theoriz-
ing. It confines its adherents to the critical analysis of pre-existing insti-
tutions, rules, and theories.132 Correspondingly, Frankenberg leaves us in 
a kind of Socratian aporia: our belief in functionalism is shattered, but no 
replacement is offered. 
 
 129. See John Finnis, On the Critical Legal Studies Movement, 30 AM. J. 
JURISPRUDENCE 21, 22 (1985); Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies 
Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561, 663–65 (1983). 
 130. Husa, supra note 7, at 420. 
 131. See, e.g., Jorge L. Esquirol, The Fictions of Latin American Law (Part I), 1997 
UTAH L. REV. 425 (1997) (providing an example of such with research on Latin Ameri-
can law). 
 132. Cf. Guyora Binder, Critical Legal Studies, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF 
LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 280–82 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996) (explaining Critical Legal 
Studies in terms of its critiques of various existing theories). 
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4. Conclusion 
Parts II and III have drawn a rather gloomy picture of comparative le-
gal methodology as a garden filled with withering or infertile flowers. It 
seems that functionalism is still dominant because of a lack of alterna-
tives, not because it is particularly well-suited. Apparently, there is need 
for a fresh sapling. But what qualities would it have to bring? The analy-
sis of functionalism has demonstrated negatively that whatever method-
ology we want to adopt for comparative studies must not work under the 
three presumptions that: law answers to social needs; problems are at 
least similar across legal systems; and these problems tend to be resolved 
in the same way. Positively, Comparative Law and Economics suggested 
that model building might be a promising alternative—“efficiency” is 
just not the neutral scale required. Cultural Deconstruction and Critical 
Legal Studies, finally, did not offer much methodologically, but provided 
at least hints for avoiding pitfalls by emphasizing the need for a contex-
tual approach. 
IV. OWN APPROACH—CONCEPTUAL COMPARISONS 
This Part tries to develop a method for comparative studies that serves 
the needs of the comparatist without being subject to the criticism out-
lined above. Section A is devoted to preliminary observations, section B 
outlines the operation of the method, and section C suggests some appli-
cations. In sections D and E, I will discuss advantages of the proposed 
method and anticipate likely objections to it. As the method uses models 
or concepts as comparata, I shall call it “Conceptual Comparisons.” 
Wherever possible, the terminology used in describing my approach is 
adapted to the usage in other social sciences that work comparatively 
with concepts to enable and foster an interdisciplinary dialogue. To illus-
trate how Conceptual Comparisons works, I will discuss the second-tier 
protection of inventions in Europe as an example. 
A. Preliminary Remarks 
1. Presuppositions 
Conceptual Comparisons rejects the presumptions upon which func-
tionalism works. However, it cannot operate without three presumptions 
of its own. Firstly, law, as the object of comparison, is understood as a 
normative system that consists of principles, rules, institutions, and other 
institutionally defined instruments.133 The conceptual structure employed 
 
 133. A similar presumption is used by Banakas, supra note 49, at 306. 
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by legal systems is important in ordering legal understanding and ensur-
ing that like cases are decided alike. Its effects must not be marginalized, 
as functionalism does and as culturalists and critical scholars do to an 
even greater extent.  
Secondly, Conceptual Comparisons acknowledges that impurities in 
the comparative act are inevitable, mainly because comparatists cannot 
escape the preconceptions of their own legal culture and education.134 
However, while it is true that the perspective on law and accordingly the 
work of individual scholars are inevitably subjective, the process by 
which legal institutions are compared is not necessarily subjective, 
too.135 Conceptual Comparisons shares the conviction of Comparative 
Law and Economics that a neutral tertium comparationis as an “expurga-
tory tool” is not only desirable, but also constructible. Objectivity is en-
visaged to derive from combined efforts of comparatists using a common 
system of reference for mutual scrutiny and criticism of each other’s 
work. Unlike Comparative Law and Economics, however, Conceptual 
Comparisons endeavors to use this reference system purely analytically. 
Thirdly, Conceptual Comparisons presumes that it is possible to for-
mulate a neutral reference system in the form of concepts. By concepts, I 
mean abstract models derived in an inductive process from specific in-
stances of real-existing law. Culturalists and critical legal scholars, how-
ever, believe that all types of categories and classifications are suspicious 
because they are culturally contingent.136 Outsiders are said to be unable 
to understand foreign classifications and translate them into their own. 
Indeed, domestic categories and classifications vary in different legal 
systems, at different times. They are neither universal nor neutral. That, 
however, only out-rules real law as a neutral tertium comparationis, but 
not purely theoretical, abstract models that dwell “in between” the exist-
ing legal systems. 
2. Conceptualisation 
Abstract models successfully serve as neutral analytical tools in the 
natural sciences. Fortunately, conceptualization is firmly established in 
the social sciences, too,137 and accepted by analytical jurisprudence as 
 
 134. See supra Part II.C.3. Cf. Peters & Schwenke, supra note 5, at 821. 
 135. But cf. Hill, supra note 42, at 104. 
 136. Curran, supra note 51, at 48; Frankenberg, Stranger than Paradise, supra note 81, 
at 267. 
 137. See KARL ENGISCH, DIE IDEE DER KONKRETISIERUNG IN RECHT UND 
RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT UNSERER ZEIT 238–39 (1953) (F.R.G); see, e.g., Arthur L. Kalle-
berg, The Logic of Comparison: A Methodological Note on the Comparative Study of 
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crucial to our perception and understanding of law.138 It is the basic tool 
for lawyers to communicate with each other and to transfer knowledge 
from one area of the law to another. However, an analogy to the concepts 
and categories of the natural sciences is only possible to a limited ex-
tent.139 The latter rely on properties that can be verified empirically. Ac-
cordingly, the categories of natural sciences can be construed so that they 
are mutually exclusive: an animal is either a vertebrate or an invertebrate. 
In social sciences, the properties used for concept construction have their 
source in theoretical discourse, rather than in observable matter; concepts 
can be cumulative. A particular legal institution can belong to more than 
one category at the same time. A compulsory license, for example, can 
be classified (by substantive matter) as a limitation of an intellectual 
property right or (procedurally) as a defense in an infringement action.140 
That is why concepts in social sciences have to be more fluid, flexible 
types, rather than schematic terms.141 To diminish the “lack of ob-
servability” in law, the comparatist is well advised to scrutinize legal 
institutions not in the abstract, but based on factual situations. 
Comparative law is not unaware of conceptualization. Classifications 
dominate macro-comparisons.142 In micro-comparisons, models have 
been used occasionally in order to give the comparatist some point of 
reference, according to which he can position legal phenomena in rela-
tion to one another.143 Moreover, nineteenth century comparative law 
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 141. See generally Großfeld, supra note 35, at 331; Hans Wolff, Typen im Recht und in 
der Rechtswissenschaft, 5 STUDIUM GENERALE 195, 197 (1952) (F.R.G).  
 142. For different macro-taxonomies, see ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 12, at 40, 64; 
Brand, supra note 42, at 1090; Mattei, supra note 138, at 5. 
 143. MATTEI, supra note 65, at 147, 179; see, e.g., Leyland, supra note 10, at 221–33 
(describing and illustrating the model method in comparing changes between the eco-
nomic systems of Russia and England); Ilse Bechthold, Ziele und Methoden der Rechts-
vergleichung zwischen beiden Teilen Deutschlands, 12 RECHT IN OST UND WEST 1, 7 
(1968) (F.R.G); Georg Schwarzenberger, Historical Models of International Law: To-
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dreamed of an ideal system, a network of universal archetypes (“univer-
salities”) that all existing legal system should approximate.144 Closer 
scrutiny of the operation of legal systems and their extra-legal connota-
tions, however, has shattered this dream. Today we accept that there is 
no single set of archetypes that can accommodate the plenty of legal 
ideas across the globe.145 Assuming the opposite necessarily leads to bias 
and misconception. 
3. Overview 
Conceptual Comparisons seeks to establish an approach to conceptu-
alization that allows expression of the variety of conceptualizations in 
different legal systems. The method draws inspiration from typology—
especially typological comparisons146—comparative methods of other 
social sciences, and plant taxonomy. It operates in two phases. In the first 
phase (conceptual orientation), the researcher construes certain elements 
of legal reality in logically precise, abstract, and unambiguous models 
(comparative concepts). In the second phase (systematic comparison), 
real-world institutions and rules can be matched and assessed against 
these concepts. The ultimate, admittedly Herculean, goal of Conceptual 
Comparisons is to establish a comprehensive network of concepts cover-
ing all legal institutions from all jurisdictions and to assess how these 
different concepts complement each other or conflict. 
The two phases of Conceptual Comparisons are two separate compara-
tive processes. Conceptual orientation requires—as we will see—
considerable preliminary comparative investigation. The following sys-
tematic comparison between the concept and the rules or legal institu-
tions from the chosen legal systems is not only supposed to provide a 
 
ward a Comparative History of International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 227, 227–50 (William E. Butler ed., 1980). 
 144. See Raymond Saleilles’ droit commun ideál in R. Saleilles, La Fonction juridique 
du Droit comparé [The Juridical Function of Comparative Law], in JURISTISCHE 
FESTGABE DES AUSLANDES ZU JOSEF KOHLERS 60. GEBURTSTAG 164 (Fritz Berolzheimer 
ed., 1909) (Fr.) and Édouard Lambert’s “droit commun legislative” in ÉDOUARD 
LAMBERT, LA FONCTION DU DROIT CIVIL COMPARÉ [THE FUNCTION OF CIVIL COMPARATIVE 
LAW] 922 (1903) (Fr.), which are the most prominent versions of this approach; see also 
Kohler, supra note 35, at 275; Radbruch, supra note 82, at 423. 
 145. See CONSTANTINESCO, TOME II, supra note 40, at 66; GEORGES SAUSER-HALL, 
FONCTION ET MÉTHODE DU DROIT COMPARÉ [FUNCTION AND METHOD OF COMPARATIVE 
LAW] 54–64 (1913) (Fr.); WATSON, supra note 40, at 12–13; Großfeld, supra note 35, at 
337; Michaels, supra note 7, at 100–01. 
 146. See Bechthold, supra note 143, at 7. Critically, see HANS-JOACHIM BARTELS, 
METHODE UND GEGENSTAND INTERSYSTEMARER RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG 75–77 (1982) 
(F.R.G). 
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detailed analysis of communalities and differences, but shall also lay 
bare the underlying determinants of the legal phenomena under scrutiny, 
including their historical and cultural dimensions. The two processes, 
however, cannot be conducted strictly one after another. They have to be 
mutually adjusted, necessitating the comparatist to shift back and forth in 
a “hermeneutical circle”—writing up the conceptual orientation to verify 
and refine it later when he or she has produced the systematic compari-
son and vice versa. For the sake of simplicity, I will refer, in the follow-
ing sections, only to the comparison of legal institutions. The compara-
tive process as such applies mutatis mutandis to rules and principles as 
well. 
B. Operation 
The conceptual comparatist begins his or her study by examining a fac-
tual situation in a particular legal system. Unlike the functionalist, the 
conceptual comparatist disregards, at this stage, to what extent these facts 
amount to a social problem. The situation can be hypothetical, but it 
should be for reasons of verifiability, preferably one that has arisen in 
practice. The research question put to the fact is, which institutions ad-
dress the facts under scrutiny? Beginning with one legal system, the re-
spective institutions are “carved up” into their properties, i.e., their struc-
ture and consequences according to the methods of the particular legal 
system. The merit of this approach is that it honors the dogmatic indi-
viduality of the legal systems under scrutiny. 
1. First Phase: Conceptual Orientation 
After having broken down the initial institution into its components, 
the comparative process begins. The main objective of the first phase of 
Conceptual Comparisons, the conceptual orientation, is to establish a 
standard for comparability in the form of a concept. Conceptualization 
renders phenomena comparable by putting them in a common context. 
The key question is how to establish a comparative concept in a mean-
ingful way—regardless of whether the comparatist is working with pre-
existing concepts147 or is developing new ones. Pre-existing concepts 
must never be passively accepted. They have to be reassessed criti-
cally—and potentially reformulated—in the same way the researcher 
would have constructed a new concept: the resulting comparative con-




 147. See also Chodosh, supra note 2, at 1091–93. 
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1. They have to be appropriate to the theoretical questions 
posed by the comparatist. 
2. They must be effective, i.e., address the factual situations 
chosen for comparison. Accordingly, concepts must not be 
characterized by disorganized or trivial properties. 
3. The properties used for concept construction must not be 
context-dependent. 
4. They have to be named unambiguously. 
5. They should be construed so that they vary as little as pos-
sible over time. 
6. Finally, their construction has to be falsifiable. A concept is 
useless when no statistical or other evidence can be obtained 
in order to review it. 
 
In order to fulfill these requirements, it is not advisable to design con-
cepts a priori and apply them afterwards in a deductive process to real-
world legal institutions. In that case, a concept might be construed too 
ideally and lack any real-world application. Political scientists, such as 
Theodore Becker for example, once defined the concept of “court” for a 
comparative study abstractly by seven characteristics.148 Shapiro rightly 
criticized this approach because he could hardly find anything real to 
subsume under the entirety of these criteria.149 Accordingly, concepts 
have to be construed by abstracting common elements from observed 
phenomena in a number of given legal systems. This inductive process 
could look like this: the comparatist should apply the initial facts, tested 
against the rules of one legal system, to another legal system and deter-
mine again the institution(s)/rule(s) that address the situation. After hav-
ing done this with a number of legal systems, the search for communal-
ities in the properties of the institutions/rules invoked begins. These 
communalities form the bones of the comparative concept. 
To gain meaningful properties for the construction of the concept, the 
abstraction process has to be exercised on two different levels, a qualita-
tive and a quantitative one. This two-fold analysis is necessary to unveil 
appropriately the legal strategies of different legal systems to deal with a 
particular factual situation. The qualitative analysis of a concept tells 
 
 148. THEODORE L. BECKER, COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL POLITICS: THE POLITICAL 
FUNCTIONINGS OF COURTS 13 (1970); see also C. Neal Tate, Judicial Institutions in 
Cross-National Perspective: Toward Integrating Courts into the Comparative Study of 
Politics, in COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL SYSTEMS: CHALLENGING FRONTIERS IN CONCEPTUAL 
AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 7, 12–13 (John R. Schmidhauser ed., 1987). 
 149. MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 1 (1981); 
see also Chodosh, supra note 2, at 1107–08. 
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which requirements a particular strategy has whereas the quantitative 
analysis reveals which factual situations a strategy can address. In this 
way, Conceptual Comparisons becomes an analysis of capability. Like 
owners of a Swiss Army knife who seldom if ever use the tools of their 
knives in their entirety, not all jurisdictions employing a certain strategy 
might be aware of which potential is inherent in the tools they use. Only 
a comparison with other legal systems that employ similar tools can dis-
close this potential. 
Both the qualitative and the quantitative analysis look at the structure 
and the consequences of a given institution or rule. The latter’s “func-
tion” and history, at this stage, are irrelevant. They are the factors that 
render legal institutions context-dependent and therefore cannot be used 
in formulating a tertium comparationis. Due respect to them will be paid 
in the systematic comparison. 
a. Qualitative Analysis 
The qualitative analysis establishes the intension of a concept: the key 
attributes that define it, delimit the concept from other concepts, and de-
termine membership. It is an empirical search for common, cross-
sectional qualities in several legal orders. Each concept is characterized 
qualitatively by the fact that its members share at least one property that 
is not found in another concept. Properties of legal institutions or rules 
can be differentiated into typical, defining ones (a, b, . . .) and accompa-
nying properties that are peculiar to individual institutions (α, β, . . .). For 
the construction of concepts, only defining properties are used; accom-
panying ones are disregarded. A comparative concept established in this 
way is analogue to a species in plant taxonomy150 and to a type in social 
sciences—what Engisch called an average type (“Durchschnittstyp”),151 
based on the characteristic properties of an average member of a group, 
rather than an ideal type (“Idealtyp”) of the kind Weber regarded as the 
basic comparative unit.152 Ideal types such as the models of “presiden-
tialism” and “parliamentarism,” formerly used in comparative public 
law, are in decline.153 Increasingly, too few instances could be found that 
 
 150. V.H. HEYWOOD, PLANT TAXONOMY 14 (2d ed. 1976). 
 151. See ENGISCH, supra note 137, at 240–41. 
 152. This type describes the perfect condition of an institution or rule that is only par-
tially approximated in reality. See NEIL J. SMELSER, COMPARATIVE METHODS IN THE 
SOCIAL SCIENCES 116 (1976). Critically on Weber’s approach, see generally Ahmed A. 
White, Max Weber and the Uncertainties of Categorical Comparative Law, in 
RETHINKING THE MASTERS OF COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 17, at 40, 53. 
 153. Rett R. Ludwikowski, Latin American Hybrid Constitutionalism: The United 
States Presidentialism in the Civil Law Melting Pot, 21 B.U. INT’L L.J. 29, 37–38 (2003). 
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were subsumable under these headings to allow a meaningful compari-
son. The following diagram illustrates the composition of comparative 
concepts: 
 
Diagram 1: Properties Used for Concept Formation154
 
                Properties of a Legal Phenomenon 
 
 
                                                              Defining Properties        Accompanying Properties 
 
 
Concept:       Second-tier     a              b              c              d 
                  Protection of 
      Inventions 
 
Institutions:   Gebrauchsmuster  a3             b3    c2  α 
 
      Petty Patent     a3     b2    c1            d                β      
 




                                                            Characteristics                          Idiosyncratics 
               Indicatives Dissimilars 
 
As shown in Diagram 1, defining properties and accompanying proper-
ties should be further differentiated into two sub-categories each. Defin-
ing properties can be distinguished into characteristics and indicatives. 
Characteristics are “compulsory” defining properties, i.e., such ones that 
in their sum are necessary and sufficient to identify an institution as a 
member of the concept. A comparative concept, being a type, should al-
ways consist of a multitude of characteristics.155 This decreases the risk 
of choosing a distinguishing property judgmentally, adds depth to the 
concept, and enhances its explanatory utility. To find out which proper-
ties are characteristics, ideally all legal systems have to be searched for 
legal institutions that share characteristics with the one of interest. Mini-
                                                                                                             
 154. The terms “defining properties” and “accompanying properties” are taken from 
Giovanni Sartori, Guidelines for Concept Analysis, in SOCIAL SCIENCE CONCEPTS: A 
SYSTEMATIC ANALYSIS 15, 33 (Giovanni Sartori ed., 1984). These subdivisions are origi-
nal. 
 155. John Gerring, What Makes a Concept Good?: A Criterial Framework for Under-
standing Concept Formation in the Social Sciences, 31 POLITY 357, 380 (1999); Heyde, 
Typus, 5 STUDIUM GENERALE 235, 239 (1952) (F.R.G). 
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mally, all legal systems that are part of the comparative research project 
have to be surveyed. 
Indicatives, or “sometimes differentiating properties,” are optional de-
fining properties. They are individually and in their sum not capable of 
defining an institution as a member of a specific concept, but they indi-
cate membership because many members of a concept share these prop-
erties. To include indicatives in the definition of a concept makes sense 
because they illustrate its dynamics. In the case of emerging concepts, 
indicatives refer to properties that might become characteristics once the 
concept has materialized fully. In the case of aging concepts, they indi-
cate properties that once were characteristics. The latter is important to 
tackle the problem of conceptual stretching.156 This problem refers to the 
distortion that occurs when an aging concept does not fit new cases. The 
usual result in such a case is that an otherwise useful concept is mal-
formed or abandoned.157 This rather unwelcome outcome can be avoided 
when means are found not to depend on the assumption that members of 
a concept share a full set of defining properties.158 Indicatives are such a 
means. 
Accompanying characteristics are those that do not serve to distinguish 
concepts from one another. They fall into the categories of dissimilars 
and idiosyncratics. Idiosyncratics are properties that are unique to a par-
ticular institution, but not characteristic enough to distinguish from other 
members of the same concept. The consideration doctrine of the common 
law, for example, would be such an idiosyncratic property within the 
concept of “voluntary agreements.”159 Dissimilar properties of a legal 
institution have a complement in other members of the same concept. 
This complement, however, is of a different kind, but again, not charac-
teristically different. Compulsory licenses, for example, are administered 
in some countries by public authorities, in others by courts. This dissimi-
lar difference is not substantial enough to subsume the two systems un-
der different concepts. 
i. Defining Properties 
To determine defining properties properly and to distinguish them from 
accompanying ones is probably the most important operation of the 
 
 156. See generally David Collier & James E. Mahon, Jr., Conceptual “Stretching” 
Revisited: Adapting Categories in Comparative Analysis, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 845 
(1993) (discussing conceptual stretching within the context of democracy and authoritari-
anism). 
 157. Heyde, supra note 155, at 239.  
 158. Collier & Mahon, supra note 156, at 852. 
 159. Reitz, supra note 3, at 621. 
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method. For practical reasons, only a part of the properties of an institu-
tion can be used for the purpose of its classification. A relevant choice 
has to be made because the classification will vary depending upon 
which element is used as the focal point. 
Gerring has recommended two key criteria for good concept formation: 
internal coherence and external differentiation.160 Internal coherence 
means that the defining properties should not merely coincide in space 
and time, but have an inner relationship to one another. External differ-
entiation means that the defining properties are chosen so that they 
clearly define the borders of the concept by delimiting it against other 
concepts. The defining properties should not only say what the concept 
is, but also what it is not. Consequentially, concepts should not overlap 
each other. Though there might be hybrid real-world legal institutions 
insofar as they might fall in between two legal concepts, there are no hy-
brid concepts. That would reduce the utility of each of the concepts and 
might increase the danger of the appearance of memberless concepts. 
Otherwise, the six criteria set out for the formation of comparative 
concepts guide the selection of defining properties. To preserve the va-
lidity of a concept, its defining properties must not be of wide variation, 
must not be easily modified by extra legal factors, and must not change 
readily.161 Furthermore, to avoid bias, characteristics should be devised 
as neutral as possible. Although, this goal will not always be achievable. 
“Genocide” is hard to define without recourse to pejorative attributes and 
“human rights” without valorizing ones.162 However, characteristics can 
at least be named neutrally: the comparatist must not rely on the idiosyn-
crasies in taxonomy and terminology of any particular jurisdiction be-
cause these were created as explicatory mechanisms for particular legal 
phenomena. Especially, homonyms in different legal systems present 
traps.163 The conceptual comparatist needs to distinguish carefully be-
tween the legal terms he or she finds (which are irrelevant for the com-
parative process) and the legal institutions they represent (which are the 
“bricks” that he or she wants for the construction of his or her concept). 
Characteristics have to represent both the structure and the conse-
quences of the legal institutions that are members of a concept. If either 
structure or consequences differ substantially, then the institutions in 
question belong to different concepts. “Morals crimes” (prostitution, dis-
 
 160. Gerring, supra note 155, at 373–76. 
 161. HEYWOOD, supra note 150, at 33. 
 162. Gerring, supra note 155, at 385. 
 163. Sartori, supra note 154, at 35–39; WATSON, supra note 40, at 11; BARTELS, supra 
note 146, at 92; Otto Kahn-Freund, Comparative Law as an Academic Subject, 82 L.Q. 
REV. 50, 52–53 (1966); see, e.g., Ainsworth, supra note 94, at 20–21. 
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tribution of child pornographic material, etc.) may, for example, fulfill 
the structural criteria of statutory sanctions in three different legal sys-
tems.164 In system A, though, the behavior is treated as a misdemeanor, 
in system B as a felony, and in system C as a mere infringement of ad-
ministrative regulations. In this case, the legal institutions of systems A 
and B can be attributed to the same comparative concept because the 
consequences—though not identical—are sufficiently similar (both sys-
tems grade the factual circumstances as criminal offenses).165 The legal 
institution of system C forms part of a separate concept (administrative 
offense). 
ii. Gradation 
The difference in consequences between legal systems A and B lead to 
another feature of Conceptual Comparisons: gradation. Concepts have to 
be defined and named in such a broad way that they cover even hetero-
geneous legal institutions, as long as they share overriding defining 
properties. Accordingly, the characteristics employed in concept forma-
tion have to be considerably wide. As in the example of “morals crimes,” 
some members of the concept will have more of a characteristic than 
others. This varying grade is highlighted in Diagram 1 as superscript 
numerals. The higher this number, the more typical is the particular insti-
tution. We measure gradation for two reasons. First, it helps concepts to 
weather the storm of scholarly debate. As empirical research of psy-
chologists suggests, concepts that are construed as rigid, logically bound 
domains defined exclusively by all-or-none criteria are unlikely to main-
tain their hold on the discourse. This is because scholars naturally dis-
agree upon how well an institution represents a concept or one of its 
characteristics.166 Secondly, gradation has an inherent analytical value. It 
allows for singling out institutions that are more central to the concept 
than others (prototypes) because they express its characteristics to an 
exceptionally pure degree. 
b. Quantitative Analysis 
In its quantitative analysis, the conceptual orientation looks at the ex-
tension of a particular concept, the entities in the world to which it refers. 
 
 164. See Richard S. Frase, Main-Streaming Comparative Criminal Justice: How to 
Incorporate Comparative and International Concepts and Materials into Basic Criminal 
Law and Procedure Courses, 100 W. VA. L. REV. 773, 788 (1998). 
 165. JOHN CYRIL SMITH & BRIAN HOGAN, CRIMINAL LAW 26 (10th ed. 2002). 
 166. See Eleanor H. Rosch, Natural Categories, 4 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 328, 328–50 
(1973). 
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These entities are the various factual situations that are covered by the 
legal institutions that form part of the concept (case lines). The underly-
ing question is, which other factual situation than the one we started with 
do the institutions that are members of the concept cover? These factual 
situations can be considered the quantitative characteristics of the com-
parative concept. Again, similar to the qualitative analysis, ideally all 
legal systems are browsed for case lines, which members of a certain 
concept address. All factual situations discovered in this way form the 
quantitative dimension of the concept, though only seldom will a real-
world institution cover the full set of situations. In its quantitative dimen-
sion, therefore, the comparative concept is a Weberian ideal type, or 
“moulded type” (“Ausprägungstypus”) in Engisch’s words,167 an ideal 
model for a group of existing legal institutions in which the determining 
qualities of these institutions are represented exceptionally purely. The 
reason why the quantitative analysis is looking for an ideal type, as op-
posed to the real type that the qualitative analysis established, is the for-
mer’s significance for the capability analysis at which the conceptual 
orientation aims. Only an ideal type allows for assessing the relative po-
tential of a particular institution later in the systematic comparison. 
In construing the quantitative dimension of the concept, one should 
remember the analogy drawn between comparative law and a diction-
ary.168 Just as a dictionary is full of obsolete and archaic, unused and 
common words, the quantitative dimension of the taxonomic concept is 
timeless. It includes all case lines that have been addressed by the con-
cept, past and present. Should more than one institution address one fac-
tual situation in a particular legal system, like, for example, an accident 
that can give rise to delictual as well as contractual liability, it is quanti-
tatively relevant for all of these institutions. 
c. Example: Conceptualization of Second-tier Protection for Inventions 
In the following section, I will give an example of how a conceptuali-
zation under Conceptual Comparisons might look, and how it might 
make comparative studies more meaningful. The example is taken from 
the field of intellectual property law. Second-tier protection for inven-
tions (second-tier protection) has become a hotbed for comparatists since 
1995 when the European Commission announced its intention to harmo-
nize national laws of the EC Member States in this regard.169 Second-tier 
 
 167. See ENGISCH, supra note 137, at 246. 
 168. Friedman, supra note 28, at 49–50. 
 169. Commission of the Eur. Communities, Green Paper: The Protection of Utility 
Models in the Single Market, COM (1995) 370 final (July 19, 1995). This report has 
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protection is conventionally defined as all forms of intellectual property 
that provide protection for minor technical inventions, which do not 
comply with the requirements of patentability.170 Such a kind of intellec-
tual property right is believed to be particularly suited for small and me-
dium-sized enterprises that make modest workshop improvements to ex-
isting products and lack the resources and the necessary market informa-
tion to engage in full-scale patenting.171
i. Pre-existing Conceptualization 
Applying Conceptual Comparisons to second-tier protection is an ex-
ercise in re-conceptualization. Comparatists have divided European ju-
risdictions already into three172 or four173 different groups of regimes that 
they see as instances of second-tier protection. The criteria used for dif-
ferentiation, so far, are the extent of subject matter protected and the test 
of necessary advance over the prior art. According to this conceptualiza-
tion, a first group, including Italy, Portugal, and Spain, has retained the 
classic “utility model” regime of the late nineteenth century. Second-tier 
protection, here, mainly fills a particular gap in the law of technical de-
sign by protecting functional shapes (“spatial forms”) of hand tools and 
similar implements, which are neither covered effectively by patent law 
nor by trade secret law.174 Jurisdictions of this group distinguish second-
tier protection from patent protection by lowering the threshold of admis-
 
been followed by a working paper in 1996; a proposal for a directive in 1997, Com-
mission Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive Approximating 
the Legal Arrangements for the Protection of Inventions by Utility Model, COM 
(1997) 691 final (Dec. 12, 1997), amended by Commission Amended Proposal for a 
European Parliament and Council Directive Approximating the Legal Arrangements 
for the Protection of Inventions by Utility Model, COM (1999) 309 final /2 (Dec. 7, 
1999); and another working paper in 2001, Commission Summary Report of Replies 
to the Questionnaire on the Impact of the Community Utility Model with a View to 
Updating the Green Paper on Protection by the Utility Model in the Internal Market, 
SEC (2001) 1307. 
 170.  MARGARET LLEWELYN, SECOND-TIER PROTECTION: EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
GREEN PAPER ON THE PROTECTION OF UTILITY MODELS IN THE SINGLE MARKET 1 (1996); 
Jeremy Newton, Towards a European Utility Model, 18 EUR. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 446, 
446 (1996). 
 171. Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the Commission’s 1995 
Green Paper, O.J. C-174/6, 1.7–1.10 (1996). 
 172. Newton, supra note 170, at 446. 
 173. WILLIAM CORNISH & DAVID LLEWELYN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENTS, 
COPYRIGHT, TRADE MARKS AND ALLIED RIGHTS ¶¶ 3-31–3-32, at 127–28 (5th ed. 2003); 
LLEWELYN, supra note 170, at 14. 
 174. J.H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 94 
COLUM. L. REV. 2432, 2458–59 (1994). 
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sibility compared with the inventive step requirement of patent law on 
the one hand, and by confining the protectable subject matter to “prod-
ucts in a spatial form” on the other hand. A second group, including 
Germany, Denmark, and Austria, has moved away from the classic util-
ity model regimes by dropping the spatial form requirement while retain-
ing the “soft” inventive step standard. A third group of countries, includ-
ing France, Belgium, and the Netherlands, likewise refrains from the spa-
tial form requirement, but unlike the second group, uses the full inven-
tiveness test of patent law. 
In addition to these three groups, some scholars recognize a fourth 
group of European jurisdictions, notably the United Kingdom and Lux-
emburg, where protection for minor inventions allegedly is provided by 
“functional equivalents” to second-tier protection, such as trade secret 
law,175 unregistered design rights,176 or the lowering of the general in-
ventiveness test in patent law.177
ii. Mis-conceptualization 
This conceptualization of second-tier protection—especially the inclu-
sion of the fourth group—is devised by scholars working in the func-
tional tradition.178 True to his or her method, the conceptual comparatist 
has to reassess the pre-existing classification critically. Upon his or her 
presumption, that the structure of a particular legal institution is impor-
tant in ordering legal understanding, it will strike him or her as question-
able, whether both the third and the fourth group of countries can be sub-
sumed under the heading “second-tier protection.” The French “certificat 
d’utilité” of the third group, for example, runs parallel with the patent 
law system with the only difference being that inventions merely get a 
short-term protection of six years under a certificat d’utilité, which is 
granted without a prior search report.179 Inventions of a lower level of 
inventiveness do not receive any particular attention. Accordingly, “sec-
ond-tier protection” in France is, in practice, used to a much lesser extent 
 
 175. Mark D. Janis, Second-tier Patent Protection, 40 HARV. INT’L L.J. 151, 215 
(1999). 
 176. CORNISH & LLEWELYN, supra note 173, ¶ 3-23, at 127; Trevor Cook, So-called 
Bio-piracy and the Beneficiaries of Protection, 47 MANAGING INTELL. PROP. 3 (1995). 
 177. Margaret Llewelyn, Proposals for the Introduction of a Community Utility Model 
System: A UK Perspective, 2 WEB J. CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES (1995), available at 
http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/articles2/llewel2.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2007). 
 178. For a general critique of functionalism’s conceptualisation capacities, see C.J.P. 
van Laer, The Applicability of Comparative Concepts, 2.2 ELECTRONIC J. COMP. L. 
(1998), available at http://www.ecjl.org/22/art22-1.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2007). 
 179. UMA SUTHERSANEN, DESIGN LAW IN EUROPE 19–006 (2000). 
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than in countries of the first two groups.180 For the conceptualist, there-
fore, the certificat d’utilité is an alternative form of patent protection,181 
rather than a second-tier protection regime. 
The conceptual comparatist will also reject subsuming “functional 
equivalents” that supposedly exist in legal systems under the concept of 
second-tier protection. Some of these “equivalents,” such as trade secret 
law, are not even equivalent because second-tier protection was explic-
itly devised in the nineteenth century to compensate their deficits (in the 
case of trade secret law deficits in protecting minor inventions).182 Oth-
ers, like the unregistered design right, afford short-term protection to 
original shapes and configurations. They are nonetheless dissimilar to 
second-tier protection in the form of a utility model right because the 
kind of protection they grant is different.183 Most importantly, the unreg-
istered design right does provide its holder with a lower level of exclu-
sive protection184 than second-tier protection of inventions. A violation 
of the registered design will only be recognized by courts when its holder 
can prove “reproduction” by copying, whereas a second-tier protection 
regime will always grant exclusive protection regardless of a proof of 
copying. Furthermore, the law of unregistered designs works with a dif-
ferent standard for protection (“creativity” instead of “inventiveness”) 
and does not warrant priority for the inventor because no registration 
takes place. Like the protection of minor inventions, within the frame-
work of patent law, by lowering the latter’s requirements for inventive-
ness, protection by unregistered design seems to be an alternative form of 
protection, rather than an equivalent to second-tier protection.185
 
 180. For the statistical data accumulated by Jeremy Tunnell, see Jeremy Tunnell, The 
International Approach of a Tired Patent System and its Role in Patent Reform in the 
United States 17 (2004), available at http://www.wise-intern.org/journal04/WISE2004-
JeremyTunnellFinalPaper.pdf. 
 181. See Friedrich-Karl Beier, The Future of Intellectual Property in Europe, 22 INT’L 
REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 157, 166 (1991). 
 182. Reichman, supra note 174, at 2458–59. 
 183. SUTHERSANEN, supra note 179, at 19–046; LLEWELYN, supra note 170, at 80–82; 
Andrew Parkes, Short-Term Patents in Ireland, 25 INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT 
L. 204, 208 (1994). 
 184. On the various levels of exclusivity in intellectual property law, see Oliver Brand, 
Die Ketten des Prometheus—Grenzen der Ausschließlichkeit im Immaterialgüterrecht, in 
JAHRBUCH JUNGER ZIVILRECHTSWISSENSCHAFTLER 2005 77, 78–83 (Axel Halfmeier et al. 
eds., 2006) (F.R.G). 
 185. LLEWELYN, supra note 170, at 33. 
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iii. Re-conceptualization 
Accordingly, the conceptual comparatist has to try to re-conceptualize 
second-tier protection. The conceptual comparatist will begin by break-
ing down legal institutions from jurisdictions, which fall into one of the 
uncontroversial first two groups, into their components to abstract the 
defining properties that he or she needs to establish the qualitative di-
mension of the concept “second-tier protection.” Most likely, the concep-
tual comparatist will come up with three characteristics.186 Second-tier 
protection covers any institution: 
 
1. whose requirements for acquiring exclusive protection are 
less stringent than those for patents, because the tests of 
“inventive step” and/or “non-obviousness” are lower or 
absent altogether; 
2. whose term of protection is shorter than that for patents 
(usually between seven and ten years without the possibil-
ity of extension or renewal); and 
3. that is not subject to substantive examination prior to the 
grant. 
 
In addition, the conceptual comparatist will find one indicative, show-
ing the rise of a new characteristic of second-tier protection. An increas-
ing number of legal systems that award some form of second-tier protec-
tion follow the German lead in affording for the applicant a grace period. 
The conceptual comparatist’s (or his or her predecessor in title’s) written 
publications or public use within six months before the priority date of 
the invention do not constitute prior art. On the other hand, unique fea-
tures, such as a limitation of the number of claims available under sec-
ond-tier protection in Australian innovation patent law,187 will be disre-
garded as accompanying properties. 
Gradation allows us to identify German, Spanish, Danish, and Irish in-
stitutions as members of the concept “second-tier protection,” though the 
threshold of novelty is surmounted at a different level. While Danish and 
Irish laws apply novelty for second-tier protection at a universal level, 
like in patent cases, German examiners take into account a more re-
stricted state of the art (written publications worldwide, but only if they 
are in public use within Germany before the priority date of the inven-
tion). In Spain, the standard is even more restricted. Here, novelty for 
 
 186. A full list of the properties that need to be assessed can be found in Tunnell, supra 
note 180, at 15. 
 187. Janis, supra note 175, at 172. 
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second-tier protection is determined according to the national state of the 
art only.188
The defining properties, as abstracted above, would enable the concep-
tual comparatist to approach second-tier protection with a refined defini-
tion of the concept: it refers to all registration-based forms of intellectual 
property that provide protection for technical inventions with a lower 
level of inventiveness without prior examination and under less onerous 
conditions than patent law. Its qualitative dimension would accordingly 
only encompass the first two groups of the initial conceptualization and 
might, in the context of neighboring concepts, look like this: 
 
Diagram 2: Second-Tier Protection Re-conceptualized 
 
    Design Law                 Second-Tier Protection of Inventions               Patent Law 
 
    Unregistered              Utility Model           Minor Inventions        Alternative 
    Design Law                   System                Protection System          Patent System 
 
    United Kingdom           Spain              Germany                      France 
                Italy              Austria                      Belgium 
                Portugal  
 
The quantitative dimension of second-tier protection—as abstracted 
from the legal institutions that contain at least all of its characteristics—
is provided in Diagram 3. The “case lines” addressed by this concept are 
the different instances of protectable subject matter that the second-tier 
regimes cover. Diagram 4 shows the quantitative “share” of the concept 
“second-tier protection” that a real-world institution—the German “Ge-
brauchsmuster”—has. The darker color indicates case lines that German 
law does not cover. 
                                                                                                             
 188. See F.P. Goebel, Schutzwürdigkeit kleiner Erfindungen in Europa—die 
materiellen Schutzvoraussetzungen für Gebrauchsmuster in den nationalen Gesetzen und 
dem EU-Richtlinienvorschlag, in GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT 
916, 919–20 (2001) (F.R.G). 
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Diagram 3: Quantitative Dimension of the Concept189







































Diagram 4: Quantitative Dimension of a Legal Institution 
 
                                                                                                             
 189. For an overview of the subject matter covered by second-tier protection, see J.W. 
BAXTER, WORLD PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE, § 1.10 (2d ed. 1973). 
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2. Second Phase: Systematic Comparison 
We have now seen how a conceptualization in phase one of Conceptual 
Comparisons might look. In the second phase, the systematic compari-
son, the concept is utilized by comparing it to real-world institutions. The 
aim is to determine and explain the extent to which these institutions 
conform to the concept or deviate from it and how they deviate from one 
another. The systematic comparison has three stages. As with the two 
phases of the comparative study themselves, these three stages of the 
second phase are not always distinctly separated from each other, nor are 
they always dealt with in the same order: they may be intermingled in the 
same discussion. The three stages are all analytical in nature. Compara-
tists will disagree, as discussed in Part III, upon whether it is permissible 
to exploit the knowledge derived from these stages normatively. There-
fore, this optional fourth stage of the systematic comparison is left out of 
the picture here. 
a. Descriptive Stage 
The first stage describes the legal phenomena under scrutiny. A proper 
description has to be objective, i.e., free from critical evaluation, as well 
as comprehensive. The latter requires the comparatist to examine the 
comparanda from at least four different perspectives. It is crucial to be-
gin with an “internal description” of the legal institution that uncovers its 
precise construction and consequences because this shows whether the 
material used for construing the defining properties of the concept has 
been assessed properly. The internal description has to take into account 
all sources of law that the legal system under comparison regards as 
such, including the written and unwritten authoritative material as well as 
affirming and derogative usage.190 These sources have to be presented as 
reflected in the intentions and procedure of the legislature, the jurispru-
dence of the courts, and the position of the doctrine. Additionally, it 
might be helpful to analyze whether the latter is divided and whether it is 
concordant or discordant with judicial positions. 
The second perspective is the conceptual one. In describing the legal 
institutions, the comparatist must make clear how they relate to the con-
cept established in phase one of the comparative process. Qualitatively, 
the comparatist has to demonstrate that the institution shows the defining 
properties of the concept. Quantitatively, it has to become clear which 
factual situations of the ideal set contained in the concept that the real-
world institutions address. 
 
 190. See ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 12, at 35–36. 
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The third perspective—the systematic one—will place the topic under 
study in the context of the entire legal system, for the same institution 
may be central for one legal system and of only marginal relevance for 
another.191 The systematic description will ask, furthermore, how an in-
stitution conforms to general principles, and whether it depends on rules 
or institutions in other areas of the law such as procedural rules, constitu-
tional provisions, or the requirements of supra-national law (e.g., EC di-
rectives). 
The fourth perspective, finally, is meta-legal. It requires a description 
of the socio-economic factors of the systems in question; their policy 
considerations; their philosophical premises, such as the roll of law; and 
their social values. This perspective is extremely important for compari-
sons, which, like Conceptual Comparisons, are based on typology. If the 
socio-economic context of the comparanda is left unexamined, then 
variations in the level of power that they confer (effective law versus 
symbolic law) remain hidden, which might impair the comparative proc-
ess.192 The meta-legal perspective also seeks to identify the actors that 
have played a role in shaping the objects of comparison because law 
must be understood as a consequence of political decisions and power 
structures.193
b. Identification Stage 
The second stage identifies the differences and similarities between the 
systems under comparison (identification stage). At this stage, the com-
paratist has to establish the extent to which the respective institutions 
deviate from the concept and from one another. In determining the devia-
tion from the concept, the question of gradation has to be addressed. Fur-
thermore, the accompanying properties of particular institutions have to 
be brought out and distinguished from the defining ones that place them 
within the concept. 
 
 191. M. Schmitthoff, The Science of Comparative Law, 7 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 94, 97–98 
(1941). For the necessity to pay due attention to the dogmatic context, see Kischel, supra 
note 13, at 18–20. 
 192. See BARTELS, supra note 146, at 77; von Senger, Von der Vergleichung des 
Rechts zur Vergleichung der Gesellschaftsführung, 47 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG 43, 62 (2006) (F.R.G); Kischel, supra note 13, at 21. 
 193. David Kennedy, New Approaches to Comparative Law: Comparativism and In-
ternational Governance, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 546, 606–14, 622–29 (1997); Olsen, supra 
note 125, at 275; see, e.g., Jennifer Widner, Comparative Politics and Comparative Law, 
46 AM. J. COMP. L. 739 (1998) (utilizing such a perspective in reflecting on the problems 
of developing comparative law research). 
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c. Explanatory Stage 
The third stage accounts for divergences and resemblances—especially 
with regard to the concept—and can therefore be called the “explanatory 
stage.” Historical analysis, functional analysis, and actor analysis exer-
cise especially strong explanatory power. Historical analysis puts institu-
tions to a “diachronic test” by revealing whether they are genuine or bor-
rowed from another legal system: legal institutions may be similar for 
three different reasons. They may have common ancestry, i.e., derive 
from the same (now discontinuous) legal institution in the past (e.g., 
Roman law), they may have developed in parallel, or they may have 
converged. Parallel development and convergence can be distinguished 
by the fact that in the former case, legal institutions developed similar 
features independently, while in the latter case, they did so through direct 
contact or through mediation of a third legal institution. The variation of 
legal institutions, on the other hand, can be explained with regard to three 
other factors. The extra-legal environment might have modified them in 
a different way or they might have diverged either through the influence 
of a third legal system or due to innovative doctrinal reconstruction in the 
domestic law. 
Alongside historical inquiry, functional analysis can be used at the ex-
planatory stage. Here, this sort of analysis is valid because it is only used 
as a means of differentiating legal institutions from one another with re-
gard to an abstract concept that has no particular function because of the 
way its characteristics are defined. Neither similarity nor difference in 
the function of the institutions under comparison is presupposed. Their 
function shall be determined exclusively in their respective domestic 
contexts. Deviations from the concept can be caused by the fact that the 
institutions might address different cases or that the cases addressed are 
problematic to a different extent in diverse legal systems. As part of a 
functional explanation, “hidden rules,” such as the political norms of the 
qian guize in China,194 can be detected and economic considerations can 
be put forward as well. Economic issues, however, again have to be ana-
lyzed strictly contextually. Otherwise, the problem of multiple optima 
might rear its troublesome head again, as we can see beautifully in our 
example of second-tier protection. Here, economic analysis in Ger-
many,195 Australia,196 and the United States197 have recommended rather 
 
 194. See von Senger, supra note 192, at 56–58. 
 195. See LLEWELYN, supra note 170, at 50–72; Michael Kern, Towards a European 
Utility Model Law, 25 INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 627, 628–29 (1994). 
 196. See AUSTRALIAN ADVISORY COUNCIL ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, A REVIEW OF 
THE PETTY PATENT SYSTEM, ch. 5 (1995). 
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different arrangements for second-tier protection, arguably because the 
respective local needs, perceptions, and institutional settings are differ-
ent, too. 
Actor analysis, finally, takes into account that legal processes are com-
plex configurations of institutional and non-institutional legal actors.198 
They give legal institutions their characteristic shape by applying and 
interpreting the standards of legal norms and doctrine. In this respect, the 
occurrence of “pre-eminent lawgivers” (überragende Nomostheten) de-
mands particular attention. A pre-eminent lawgiver is a person who coins 
institutional actions (i.e., court decisions or enactments) to such an extent 
that these actions appear his or her own, rather than actions of the institu-
tion in which he or she is embedded.199 At the same time, the influence 
of actors cannot be measured in terms of their impact on positive law 
only.200 Otherwise, the influence of legal scholars like Rheinstein, 
Ehrenzweig, or Kelsen, who “never directly influenced enactments or 
court decisions,” would be overlooked.201 As the influence of a particular 
actor is determined by his role within a given legal culture, the central 
questions to be addressed by the comparatist regarding actor analysis are: 
Who is responsible for the development of the law? Which interest 
groups support change or adherence to the law? Are there changes in the 
institutional structure of an actor (affirmative action, regime change, 
etc.)? What are the motives and perspectives of these groups? Which are 
their formal and informal roles in a given society and how do they inter-
act with other actors? In our example of second-tier protection, answer-
ing questions such as these can highlight, for example, why some legal 
systems have not adopted such a form of intellectual property: in the 
Netherlands, local industry lobby groups prevented an enactment of sec-
ond-tier protection because they feared its enactment might favor foreign 
competitors.202
 
 197. Janis, supra, note 175, at 189–90. 
 198. BELL, supra note 40, at 12–13, 19; Chodosh, supra note 2, at 1112. 
 199. On pre-eminent lawgivers, see Oliver Brand, Language as a Barrier to Compara-
tive Law (unpublished article) (on file with author). 
 200. Cf. Edward Rubin as criticized by Meir Dan-Cohen, Listeners and Eavesdrop-
pers: Substantive Legal Theory and Its Audience, 63 COLO. L. REV. 569 (1992). Hermann 
Kantorowicz gives a good methodological example. He argued that law is shaped not 
only by judicial actions, but also by scholarship. See, e.g., Hermann Kantorowicz, Some 
Rationalism About Realism, 43 YALE L.J. 1240 (1933). 
 201. Ugo Mattei, Why the Wind Changed: Intellectual Leadership in Western Law, 42 
AM. J. COMP. L. 195, 208 (1994). 
 202. Dick van Engelen, The Misappropriation Doctrine in the Netherlands, 22 INT’L 
REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 11, 21 (1991). For similar influences in nineteenth 
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d. Contextuality 
In all three stages, the legal institutions under scrutiny must be viewed 
in the socio-economic and cultural context in which they thrive. This 
context is vital for a proper understanding and accurate delineation of the 
law at the descriptive stage, for the precise identification of differences 
and similarities at the identification stage, and for a valid evaluation at 
the explanatory stage as well. As established above in the critique of 
functionalism, a mere study of texts and formal rules will give an incom-
plete and distorted picture. Some socio-economic and cultural back-
ground is needed in every comparative study. The amount of contextual 
discussion necessary depends on the socio-cultural proximity of the legal 
systems chosen for comparison.203 The greater the proximity between the 
comparanda, the less detail of the general social context needs to be ex-
amined. In intra-cultural comparisons—e.g., comparing German and 
Austrian law—the “socio-cultural context” may be restricted to the im-
mediately relevant aspects of the social and economic environment. In 
comparisons of legal systems that belong to distinct societies (cross-
cultural comparisons)—e.g., English law and Maori law—a detailed dis-
cussion of the social structure and organization is essential to properly 
assess factors such as social differentiation. To highlight the socio-
economic background, methods of sociological research might have to be 
employed, such as statistical evidence,204 questionnaires, and inter-
views.205 Documents from legal practice such as standard business terms, 
register forms, etc., furthermore help to fill the abstract rules of foreign 
law with life. 
C. Applications 
Conceptual Comparisons aims to permit comparisons among the entire 
range of legal systems, even between systems from dissimilar socio-
economic environments and between “radically different cultures.” Natu-
rally, however, the same set of legal systems is not equally relevant for 
 
century Britain, see Brad Sherman & Lionel Bently, The United Kingdom’s Forgotten 
Utility Model: The Utility Designs Act 1843, 3 INTELL. PROP. Q. 265, 273–75 (1997). 
 203. W.J. Kamba, Comparative Law: A Theoretical Framework, 23 INT’L & COMP. 
L.Q. 485, 515 (1974). 
 204. Recently, comparative expertise in this respect is made available under the head-
ing of “numercial comparative law.” See Mathias M. Siems, Numerical Comparative 
Law: Do We Need Statistical Evidence in Law in Order to Reduce Complexity?, 13 
CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 521 (2005). Critically, see Detlev F. Vagts, Comparative 
Company Law—The New Wave, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR JEAN NICOLAS DRUEY 595, 598–99 
(Rainer J. Schweitzer et al. eds., 2002) (F.R.G). 
 205. See Drobnig, supra note 30, at 499–03. 
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every comparative study. The question of which legal systems the com-
paratist should choose to compare must be answered on a case-by-case 
basis. The concentration on “parent systems”206 is not even good as a 
working rule. Rather, the choice of the comparanda depends on the kind 
of study that the comparatist wants to undertake. In the following sec-
tions, the range of studies that Conceptual Comparisons allows is ex-
plored. In the diagrams, included for reasons of clearness, squares sym-
bolize concepts, ellipses stand for individual legal institutions, and ar-
rows indicate the comparative studies that may be undertaken. 
1. Deviant Case Studies 
The first interesting application of 
Conceptual Comparisons is the “deviant 
case study.” After having established a 
concept, this kind of study takes one of 
the ordinary members of the concept 
and compares it to another member of 
the same concept that possesses either a 
remarkable quantitative dimension—be 
it exceptionally large or small—or a notable number of accompanying 
properties (deviant case). Deviant case studies make use of the critical 
potential of comparative law. They reveal the tolerance of a concept to-
wards the moral and political values imposed by legal systems upon the 
form and substance of legal institutions. In the example of second-tier 
protection, Austrian law would qualify as a deviant case within the con-
cept because, quantitatively, it is the only jurisdiction that uses this kind 
of intellectual property right to provide protection for software.207
2. Contrastive Comparisons 
Like deviant case studies, contrastive 
comparisons aim to highlight the diver-
sity of law. There are two versions of 
this application. Intra-conceptual con-
trastive comparisons concentrate on 
“polar types,” members of the same 
concept that differ maximally either in 
illustrative and accompanying properties 
or in the underlying socio-economic implications. These comparisons 
 
 206. ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 12, at 41. 
 207. [Utility Model Act] Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBl] No. 211/1994, Part I, §§ 1–12; see 
Goebel, supra note 188, at 917. But cf. Janis, supra note 175, at 190. 
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use concepts as “benchmarks” against which to establish the unique fea-
tures of the real-world systems under scrutiny. Their heuristic value is to 
map the width of the concepts. In our example of second-tier protection, 
the comparison of a (narrow) classical utility model system, such as the 
Spanish one, and a much wider second-tier system, such as the Irish 
“petty patent” or the Austrian “Gebrauchsmuster” that protect any pat-
entable subject-matter, would be an instance worthy of a contrastive 
study. Intra-conceptual contrastive comparisons also allow for compari-
sons in highly value-laden areas of law. One might compare, for exam-
ple, the approach of the “antipodes of the Muslim world,” Indonesia,208 
and Morocco,209 towards the discrimination of women under the com-
mon roof of the shari’a principles. 
Inter-conceptual comparisons juxtapose a member of one concept with 
a member of another concept, while both institutions address a similar set 
of factual situations. To compare members of different concepts is valid 
because the applicability of concepts as a tertium comparationis does not 
depend on the actual presence or absence of the relevant characteristics 
in the legal institutions compared, but rather on the capability of these 
institutions to exhibit that characteristic.210 That is the reason why it is 
possible to apply foreign concepts to one’s own legal system, as it has 
been done, for example, in a study applying American theories of evi-
dence to Dutch criminal justice.211 A contrastive comparison with an in-
stitution outside the concept of second-tier protection would probably 
ask how the United States or the United Kingdom addresses the case 
lines covered by second-tier protection, highlighting problems with sub-
stituting second-tier protection with trade secret law and a reduced inven-
tiveness standard in patent law. 
 
 208. See, e.g., SHARI’A AND POLITICS IN MODERN INDONESIA 123 (Arskal Salim & 
Azyumardi Azra eds., 2003). 
 209. See, e.g., Bharathi Anandhi Venkatraman, Note, Islamic States and the United 
Nations Convention on the Eliminination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women: 
Are the Shari’a and the Convention Compatible?, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1949, 1977–81 
(1995). 
 210. E. Gene DeFelice, Comparison Misconceived, 13 COMP. POL. 119, 123 (1980). 
 211. See., e.g., WILLEM A. WAGENAAR, PETER J. VAN KOPPEN, & HANS F.M. CROMBAG, 
ANCHORED NARRATIVES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CRIMINAL EVIDENCE (1993). 
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3. Developmental and Hybrid Studies 
Conceptual Comparisons can also 
analyze developments in the rela-
tionships between legal systems. Such 
an analysis has to be exercised in two 
steps. In a first step, the comparatist has 
to explore tendencies of convergence or 
divergence between legal systems (in 
terms of “real” differences). In a second 
step, a comparative developmental study would explain and evaluate 
such tendencies: Why do systems converge or diverge? Is convergence 
desirable or undesirable? In an increasingly integrated world, conver-
gence may, for example, be required under international (e.g., World 
Trade Organization [WTO]) or supra-national (e.g., European Union 
[EU]) law. Consequently, “hybrid” legal institutions at the “intersec-
tions” of comparative concepts may emerge. The existence of hybrids 
can also be explained by the fact that characteristics cannot always be 
formulated in a “binary code:” real-world legal institutions do not fit into 
characteristics in a “yes-or-no” way, or a “more-or-less” way, if you take 
gradation into account. They might fit in only “partially,”212 as the 
French “certificat d’utilité” does, for example, in the system of second-
tier protection as well as in the system of patent protection. 
4. Taxonomic Comparisons 
A fourth possible application for Conceptual Comparisons is taxo-
nomic comparison. Concepts can be differentiated into equivalent, hori-
zontal categories and hierarchical, vertical ones. The latter can be organ-
ized in the form of taxonomies similar to the botanical ordering of genus, 
species, and sub-species. A taxonomy of concepts—while certainly not 
an end in itself—might enhance the heuristic value of comparative law as 
an organizational discipline.213 It simplifies and systematizes data collec-
tion and makes intra- and inter-group comparisons easier by highlighting 
the interrelation of concepts. 
Concepts, which share the most characters in common, can be placed 
into larger, more inclusive classes (genera); these in turn are assembled 
into even more inclusive groups called families as outlined in Diagram 5. 
The concept, “agreement of sale,” for example, belongs to the genus 
“voluntary agreements” that forms part of the family “obligations.” Each 
                                                                                                             
 212. See generally Tate, supra note 148, at 19–20 (listing examples). 
 213. Kokkini-Iatridou, supra note 40, at 151. But see Sandrock, supra note 87, at 65. 
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vertical class can be understood as a different level of abstraction. We 
climb the “ladder of abstraction by reducing (in number) the characteris-
tics of a concept [and] descend a ladder . . . by augmenting (in number) 
[those] characteristics.”214 It is advisable, however, to climb the ladder of 
abstraction with care. A concept described by only very few characteris-
tics can become analytically insignificant.215 When the conceptual com-
paratist climbs the ladder of abstraction, he or she has to be careful. The 
quantity of objects that a concept refers to says nothing about its analyti-
cal utility. Therefore, even concepts that have only one member can be 
built (monotypic concepts).216 That might be useful and necessary for 
including very remote legal systems in a comparative study. 
 
    Diagram 5: Taxonomic Organization of Concepts217
                                                                                                                         
                    
                      
 









                                                          
 




 Genus (monotypic)  
At this point, it should be reiterated that the concepts, which Concep-
tual Comparisons forms, are not necessarily alternative, i.e., mutually 
exclusive. They can also be cumulative, i.e., concepts in which institu-
tions can be classed that also belong to another category.218 This is un-
problematic as long as comparatists are aware that the taxonomies they 
create with Conceptual Comparisons constitute a number of interrelated 
taxonomic “trees” that comparatively describe the law, and not a single, 
unitary one. 
 
 214. Sartori, supra note 154, at 44. 
 215. BARTELS, supra note 146, at 76. 
 216. Cf. SMELSER, supra note 152, at 176. 
 217. The diagram is an adaptation of HEYWOOD, supra note 150, at 14. 
 218. See supra Part IV.B.1.b. 
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5. Prototype Studies 
Concepts will be frequently derived 
from a specific system of geopolitical 
and economic significance to the com-
paratist’s audience. That might lead to 
an implicit equivalence of a parochial 
“prototype” with the concept.219 It might 
be interesting to compare the prototype 
with other members of the concept. This 
could elucidate the way in which the concept and its members develop. 
Prototype studies could reveal, for example, that concepts are becoming 
more condensed because of internal tendencies for further convergence. 
As it might happen in the case of second-tier protection, the intended 
harmonization of the law of EC Member States is closely based on the 
“prototypical” German approach.220 On the other hand, it might be 
shown that concepts are becoming weaker because benchmark jurisdic-
tions that have provided models for shaping a particular area of the law 
lose their appeal, as it now happens with German company law.221
6. Diachronous Comparisons 
A sixth application for Conceptual 
Comparisons is the diachronous study. 
These studies involve either the com-
parison of subsequent legal institutions 
in one legal system that is a member of 
a specific concept, or the comparison of 
different members of a concept that ex-
isted at different periods of time. Such 
comparisons establish the historical connections within a concept and 
allow the study of legal development. In the case of second-tier protec-
tion, it might be interesting, for example, to compare the German ap-
proach prior to 1990, when it still had a spatial form requirement, with 
the present Spanish or Italian law, which currently maintains this re-
quirement. 
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7. Case Studies 
Case studies, the final application of 
Conceptual Comparisons, are concen-
trated on one particular factual situation. 
In a particular case, we might ask for 
example: How do different legal sys-
tems deal with minor improvements in 
the manufacture of hand-tools? From 
that starting point, the comparatist has to 
find out which legal institutions are invoked by the legal systems that he 
or she wants to study to deal with the situation. These institutions, in 
turn, have to be grouped under the various concepts to which they be-
long. Only then is a direct comparison between the different legal institu-
tions possible. 
D. Virtues of the Method 
The applications of Conceptual Comparisons indicate some advantages 
of the method. First, it allows for studies not viable under functionalism 
or any of the other methods discussed in Part III. Prototype studies, taxo-
nomic comparisons, and diachronous comparisons, are unique to Con-
ceptual Comparisons. This method also responds to a rising call for ex-
panding the scope of comparative law to purely domestic contexts (one-
country studies).222 In areas where legal transplants are frequent, as in 
company law, transplanted and domestic institutions often co-exist and 
compete with each other in the same legal system. Conceptual Compari-
sons might provide a proper yardstick to analyze such situations because 
it does not require comparanda from different legal systems to be opera-
tional. 
Secondly, over time, Conceptual Comparisons will establish a common 
reference system in the form of the concepts that it develops. Thereby, it 
might serve as a “research cycle” that allows a more fruitful dialogue of 
scholars working in different traditions. Critical legal scholars and cul-
turalists can continue their work within the framework of “deviant case 
studies” and “contrastive comparisons.” They can, furthermore, monitor 
whether the explanatory stage of phase II pays due respect to the extra-
legal context of the rules examined. Functionalists—in the broader and 
the narrower sense—can also carry on contributing to comparative stud-
ies. Conceptual Comparisons probably makes their insights even more 
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valuable. It frees them from objections against the premises upon which 
they work by acknowledging that the function of law is context-
dependent and by consequently limiting the role of functionalism to that 
of an explanatory tool in phase II of the comparative process. 
Thirdly, Conceptual Comparisons might make the application of 
knowledge derived from comparative studies more likely. The works of 
comparative lawyers, especially those from civil law jurisdictions, are 
often disregarded by their more dogmatically oriented colleagues be-
cause of their functional or otherwise un-dogmatic approach. Conceptual 
Comparisons has the capacity to alter this by providing a framework that 
pays more attention to the constructional details of the law and might 
therefore dissolve or mitigate the antagonism between comparatists and 
dogmatic scholars. 
Fourthly, Conceptual Comparisons makes the choice of legal systems 
for comparison more transparent and rational. The process advocated so 
far by functionalism is dependent on implicit choices necessitated by the 
functionalists’ general avoidance to discuss questions of “likeness” and 
on the operational limitations that the three presuppositions of function-
alism force upon the comparatist. In contrast, the conceptualization un-
dertaken in phase I of Conceptual Comparisons provides a criterion that 
requires the comparatist to make an explicit and rational choice. As the 
sample applications sketched above have shown, the comparatist will 
have to limit research to those legal systems that fit the kind of study he 
or she wants to undertake. That can still be “radically different cultures” 
in the case of a contrastive comparison or members of the same concept 
in a prototype or deviant case study. 
Finally, Conceptual Comparisons can assist the study of legal trans-
plants in numerous ways. Conceptualization has predictive value.223 It 
can predict legal transplants and legal change by answering questions 
such as: Why and how do legal systems change? Which factors are more 
likely to resist legal change by imitation? How does the structure of a 
recipient legal system affect and modify a received legal institution? The 
conceptualization undertaken in phase I of the method also helps to un-
derstand the transplanting process itself better. It provides a degree of 
measurement against which it can be established, whether legal change 
takes place in the form of a gradual process of “cross-fertilisation”224 or 
whether entire tracts of law move from one system to another. Thus, 
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regulative competition between legal systems becomes more transparent. 
Conceptual Comparisons furthermore allows us to distinguish between 
two kinds of transplants: intra- and inter-conceptual transplants. The 
former are more likely to happen and more likely to be successful be-
cause the receiving and the donating legal system can rely on a suffi-
ciently similar structure in addressing a certain factual situation. 
E. Possible Objections to the Method 
In conclusion of this study, there are four likely objections to Concep-
tual Comparisons that I would like to pre-empt. 
First, it might be said that Conceptual Comparisons has little value for 
practical comparative law.225 Practitioners, especially judges, will not 
base their decisions on artificial average types or ideal types like the con-
cepts established by the proposed method. That is certainly true. It is 
maintained, however, that “practically applicable comparative law” is an 
illusion anyway. The restraints on time and resources—especially of 
courts—are too pressing to allow meaningful comparative work on a 
broad scale.226 To make comparative law practicably relevant, it has to 
be “filtered” through the “lenses” of comparative scholarship that in turn 
can be consulted by practitioners.227 Conceptual Comparisons, in this 
regard, makes sure that the distorting effect of the lenses is mineralized. 
Secondly, comparatists might fear that Conceptual Comparisons leads 
them back into the formalism of nineteenth century comparative law and 
Saleilles’ dream of a droit commun ideál. That fear is unfounded. Con-
ceptual Comparisons acknowledges that social facts are so diverse that 
they do not lend themselves to a single scheme of concepts. Respec-
tively, it does not claim that there is a single set of mutually exclusive 
concepts under which all legal institutions of all legal systems can be 
subsumed. As shown in the description of taxonomic comparisons, the 
proposed method rather sees concepts on a horizontal level as competing 
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ways of addressing a factual situation, allowing for a variety of alterna-
tive and cumulative concepts that can be vertically integrated in different 
ways. As long as the comparatist explains the construction of his con-
cepts in a way that allows other comparatists to verify them, there is also 
no need to fear228 that value judgments of the individual comparatists 
may become intermingled inseparably with seemingly neutral concepts. 
Thirdly, one might suggest that the proposed method makes case stud-
ies, which form the bulk of the comparative work, exceedingly difficult. 
It is conceded that Conceptual Comparisons makes them more complex. 
That, however, is only appropriate. Case studies are inherently dangerous 
because they only ask how the law addresses one particular factual situa-
tion, without regard to other situations with which the institution may 
have to deal. Conceptual Comparisons forces the comparatist to take into 
account that not only the law, but also the factual situation it addresses, 
must be seen as part of a wider context. 
Finally, scholars might object that functionalism may not be displaced 
as the core method of comparative law because of its analytical value for 
private international law. In fact, there are various approaches to conflict 
of laws that use “functional” or “teleological” methods in characterizing 
foreign legal institutions or rules.229 However, these approaches have to 
be distinguished methodologically from functionalism as the basis of 
comparative law. That becomes evident already by the fact that func-
tional analysis in the field of private international law routinely works in 
areas that comparative functionalism admits to be beyond its reach, e.g., 
family law.230 The demise of functionalism as the basis of comparative 
studies and its replacement with Conceptual Comparisons would there-
fore not interfere with the mechanisms of private international law. 
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